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Chapter 1: Introduction
The recent and ongoing developments in the Middle East1, deemed the “Arab Spring,”
have highlighted the fact that the region is mostly ruled by autocratic governments, which has
largely been the case ever since the end of World War II.2 Certainly, other countries in the world
such as North Korea are autocratic, but according to Posusney (2005), the “density” with which
authoritarianism exists in the Middle East sets it apart from the rest of the world.3 With the fall
of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the early 1990s, the general consensus
among many observers4 was that the Middle East would embrace democracy as what had been
occurring throughout the world during the “Third Wave” of democratization.5 However, the
Middle East did not follow this trend and this led to the beginning of what would become a new
topic in studies of the region: the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East.
For some scholars, like Samuel Huntington, the persistence of authoritarianism was
evidence that the region was exceptional—that there was something inherent and particular about
it that prevented democratization, namely, Middle Eastern culture or more specifically, Islam.
Others6 attribute the persistence of authoritarianism to the argument of the rentier state theory. It
is described in greater detail in the following chapter, but to briefly note here, its main assertion
is that states can rule through redistributing wealth throughout their societies. According to the
theory’s proponents, in terms of the Middle East, oil revenue (and other sources of income) is
1

I define the Middle East as the area stretching from North Africa to Iran.
It is impossible to ignore the current developments in the region. At the time of this writing (March 2012), the
“Arab Spring” is ongoing in the Middle East. The Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan governments have fallen, yet the
democratic outcomes in those countries and in others remains to be seen.
3
Posusney, “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit,” 2.
4
Anderson, 189.
5
As defined by Samuel Huntington three ‘waves’ of democratization (transitions to democracy) have occurred in
history, the last of which is still occurring. The first took place in Europe and North America in the 1880s. The
second began after the WWII and ended in the early 1970s. The third wave began in the mid 1970s in Latin
America and in eastern European countries formerly controlled by the Soviet Union. [Huntington, Samuel. The
Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman: Univ. Oklahoma Press, 1993].
6
See: Ross, Michael; and Karl, Terry L.
2
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this ‘wealth’ and they contend that its redistribution enables authoritarian regimes in the region
to remain in power. Advocates of this view reached this conclusion after analyzing the impact of
oil wealth on the state and society. In other words, they examined the relationship between oil,
politics, society and the state.
The purpose of this thesis is to investigate these relationships in two country case studies:
Iran and Saudi Arabia. It will reexamine the conventional wisdom about oil’s effect on state and
society held by the rentier state theory and offer new insights about the causes of
authoritarianism in the Middle East. While oil wealth has unquestionably played an important
role in the region’s history, it by itself does not create or sustain authoritarian governments. The
rentier state theory is problematic because it asserts that oil wealth overrides other causal
contributing factors. This thesis challenges this assumption and argues that oil is one of several
other, arguably more consequential, factors that account for the persistence of authoritarianism in
the Middle East.
The in-depth examination of Iran and Saudi Arabia will reveal that authoritarianism in
the region can be attributed to geopolitical contexts, specific political processes and socioeconomic conditions in addition to oil. As such, the following chapters examine both the
external and internal dynamics of the country case studies. In terms of the former, the Cold War
context and the role that oil played will be analyzed. In terms of the latter, the domestic contexts
of these countries will also be assessed. This is important because doing so will reveal Iran and
Saudi Arabia’s political structures and socio-economic conditions—factors that have contributed
to these regimes’ survival.
Much of the literature on the topic of authoritarianism in the Middle East touch on and
often discuss in detail the role of international relations and actors in the region. Given the

2

considerable amount of foreign interaction and penetration into the Middle East during the
twentieth-century, such discussions inevitably delve into the past and analyze the effects of
external (Western or others) actors on domestic affairs. When one thinks of the foreign
interventionism in the Middle East during the previous century, the natural resource, oil, usually
comes to mind. Access to oil was a major economic and geostrategic concern for Western
powers, Russia and others especially after World War II. Many scholars contend that Western,
particularly American, support of authoritarian governments, in return for access to oil and other
strategic considerations, has directly prevented democratization in the region.7
I chose Iran and Saudi Arabia as case studies for several reasons. Both are considered
prominent examples as rentier states in that they depend heavily on oil revenues.8 Saudi Arabian
oil, which amounts to approximately 25% of the world oil reserves, is vital for the world
economy.9 Its oil revenues, for example, help fund its health care, education system and other
social services. Iran possesses the world’s third largest oil reserves as well as the second largest
natural oil reserves in the world.10 Like Saudi Arabia, Iran has used its oil revenues to fund
social, economic, and industrial development programs. Saudi Arabian and Iranian oil thus
make both countries economically and geopolitically important for the Middle East and the rest
of the world. Additionally, the United States has a significant American military presence in
Saudi Arabia. From Saudi Arabia’s point of view, this serves as protection against regional
rivals, and for the United States, it protects American access to oil. There is no such American
presence in or even formal diplomatic relations with Iran.
7

Posusney, 17.
The theory of the rentier state originated in an essay written by Iranian economist Hussein Mahdavy, where he
analyzed the Iranian economy during the 1950s and 1960s. See Mahday, Hussein. “The Patterns and Problems of
Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran,” in M.A. Cook, ed., Studies in Economic History of
the Middle East (London: Oxford University Press, 1970).
9
Niblock, 1-2.
10
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “Iran: Overview/Data,” http://www.eia.gov/countries/countrydata.cfm?fips=IR [accessed May 29, 2011].
8
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There are key differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As the country where the two
most holy sites of Islam are located, Saudi Arabia possesses a high level of political and religious
authority in the region.11 Since Iran is a majority Shi’a Muslim country, it has influence over
other areas in the Middle East, such as Iraq, where large numbers of Shi’a live. Additionally,
foreign relations with the rest of the world, particularly the West, tend to be different. For
example, Saudi Arabia and the United States are close military and economic allies, whereas the
United States views Iran with suspicion, especially with its alleged nuclear weapons program.
The last difference, of which there are many others, mentioned here is that the Saudi Arabian
government is a monarchy, whereas the Iranian government is an Islamic Republic, in that it is
both republican and theocratic. These different political structures are important variables in the
discussions of the following chapters.
It would be impossible to discuss and analyze the entire history of both countries during
the 20th century, so this thesis focuses on the time period beginning in 1973 to the present day.
1973 is an important year because oil revenues significantly increased as a consequence of the
October War, also known as the Yom Kippur War, between Israel and the coalition of Arab
nations (Syria, Iraq and Jordan) led by Egypt.12 OPEC (the Organization of Arab Exporting
Countries) decided to reduce oil production in retaliation for American arms supply to Israel
during the war and some member countries increased oil prices by significant margins.13 This
resulted in the 1973-1974 Oil Crisis and the subsequent oil boom that lasted until the early
1980s. International oil prices quadrupled. Iran’s oil revenues increased from $5 billion in

11

Niblock, 6.
The coalition aimed to recapture lands taken by Israel during the 1967 War, also known as the Six Day War.
During those six days in June of that year, the Israeli captured the Sinai Peninsula, the Golan Heights, East
Jerusalem, and the West Bank.
13
Goldschmidt, 339.
12
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1973-1974 to $20 billion in 1975-1976.14 The boom altered the Saudi Arabian state and its
relationship with society. The state shifted from a modernizing, redistributive and administrative
state, one that required the knowledge and expertise to run a national economy, towards a mainly
distributive state, one that allocated oil revenue to subsidies in real estate, agriculture and
industry; the state bureaucracy increased in size as well.15 In short, 1973 is an appropriate
starting point not only for its significance, but also that, as the rentier state theory would predict,
the “rentier qualities” of both Iran and Saudi Arabia intensified during the following years.
This thesis consists of five chapters, including this introduction. Chapter II is the
theoretical overview of the literature that addresses authoritarianism in the Middle East. This
chapter discusses in detail the arguments about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle
East and also introduces theoretical arguments that challenge the rentier state theory. Chapters
III and IV examine Iran and Saudi Arabia, respectively. An historical overview up to 1973
begins each of these two chapters, which is then followed by the main analytical portion of the
chapters. Both chapters examine the historical and domestic contexts of their respective
countries. Additionally, a discussion about the Arab Spring is at the end of each of these two
chapters. Finally, Chapter V is the Conclusion and it also addresses the Arab Spring.

14
15

Abrahamian, 124.
Menoret, 107.

5

Chapter II: Authoritarianism in the Middle East – A Theoretical Overview
A. Literature Review
The question is often asked, why does the Middle East remain largely authoritarian? Or,
as it is sometimes posed, why does it continue to experience a democratic deficit
(notwithstanding the ongoing developments in the region)? As discussed in the introduction,
various scholars have put forward several competing theories and arguments regarding this topic.
These tend to fall under four main categories: culture, institutions, the history of international
relations and actors in the Middle East, and oil/rentier state.
Scholars such as Samuel Huntington and Ellie Kedourie, contend that the lack of
democracy in the region stems from the belief that Middle Eastern culture, which they equate
with Islam (the reasons for this are discussed in further detail below), is incompatible with
democracy. Huntington made this argument in his well-known 1993 Foreign Affairs article,
“The Clash of Civilizations?”16 A decade earlier, he asserted that “Islam has not been hospitable
to democracy.”17 Huntington and other proponents of this view generally argue that Islam’s
incompatibility with democracy stems from its system of law, known as Shari’a. Shari’a law
lays out the rules and regulations by which Muslims ought to live and links religion and daily life
together. Thus, the argument contends, Islamic traditions and values are antithetical to
democratic notions of liberty, human rights, and the separation of church and state. According to
Elie Kedourie, whereas democracy in the West is based on Western political traditions of
constitutions and representational governments, as well as the notion of a sovereign nation state,

16

Huntington, Samuel P. “The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (Summer, 1993): 22–49.
Huntington, Samuel P., 208. "Will Countries Become More Democratic?" Political Science Quarterly, 99, no. 82
(Summer 1984): 193-218.
17
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no equivalent traditions exist within Islam.18 As a result, Kedourie asserts, democracy is “quite
alien to the mindset of Islam.”19
Princeton professor Bernard Lewis discusses the culture argument further.20 Although he
does not specifically address the issue of the persistence of authoritarianism, Lewis holds
essentially the same conclusion. He argues that the roots of Western dominance (or, more
bluntly, Middle Eastern failure to counter it) are found within Islam. Historically speaking,
particularly during the last century or so of the Ottoman Empire, Lewis contends, Islamic beliefs
hindered Muslims from fully adopting and assimilating Western cultural norms and values,
political practices, and science. Consequently, for a long time the Middle East was slow to
“modernize” or “Westernize” and match the progress made by the West; large gaps between the
Middle East and the West existed in terms of scientific knowledge, social norms like the status of
women, and the separation of religion and the state. When attempts at nationalism and socialism
in the 20th century failed to bring about a significant resurgence of Middle Eastern “civilization,”
Middle Easterners placed the blame for this elsewhere, particularly towards Western
“imperialism.”21 Instead, Lewis states that people of the Middle East need to “abandon
grievance and victimhood” in order for the region to return its former glory.22
All of these arguments are rooted in what Edward Said called “Orientalism.” According
to Said, Orientalism is the name for the discourse employed by Europeans and later, Americans,
to describe, study, and dominate the Middle East.23 There is not sufficient space nor is it
appropriate for this thesis to discuss Orientalism in its entirety here. However, one important
18

Kedourie, 3.
1.
20
Lewis, Bernard. What Went Wrong: The Clash Between Islam and Modernity in the Middle East. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002.
21
153.
22
160.
23
Said, Edward. Orientalism. New York: Vintage Books, 1979.
19
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aspect of it pertains to the culture argument discussed above: the notion of the “other.” The
“other” is as an imagined, collective group of people who ought to be feared and considered
fundamentally different from another group. In the Orientalist discourse, the West has
historically viewed the Orient24 as the collective “other;” the Orient was a place of exoticism,
romance and antiquity, whereas Europe was the place of enlightened, advanced and sophisticated
civilization.
In its construction of the notion of the “other,” the discourse regarded the entire Middle
East as one unchanging entity, retaining an essential “essence.” Orientalists regarded the
religion of Islam as having such an immutable essence and subsequently equated Middle Eastern
culture with Islam. When it became clear to scholars that democracy would not spread to the
Middle East after the Cold War as it did in other parts of the world, they began to look towards
Middle Eastern culture, and hence Islam, as the primary reason for the lack of democracy in the
region. Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” thesis reinforced the notion that culture, rather than
nation states, ought to be the main focus of study in the field of international studies.25
Other scholars have presented factual data to support the notion of the Islam/democracy
divide. In a 2002 paper, Steven Fish argues through statistical analysis that a strong link exists
between Islam and authoritarianism.26 Specifically, he contends, the subordination of women in
Muslim societies is a central factor that accounts for the democratic deficit. According to Fish,
variables, such as low female literacy rates, high population sex ratios (a high number of males
per 100 females), the lower number of women in government, and weak gender empowerment

24

The ‘Orient’ referred to not only the Middle East but also the entire Asian continent and North Africa.
Huntington, Samuel. “The Clash of Civilizations?,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3 (Summer, 1993): pp. 22-49.
In his article, Huntington sees the world divided into several distinct and separate “civilizations,” which include
Western, Latin-American and Islamic civilizations. Nation states would continue to be the main actors in world
affairs but conflict would arise “between nations and [these] groups of different civilizations”
26
Fish, Steven. “Islam and Authoritarianism,” World Politics 55 (October 2002): 4-37.
25
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measures (a variable used by the United Nations Development Program studies to measure the
overall status of women in a given society), indicate an overall inferior status of women in
Muslim societies. Thus, women’s social standing serves as an important factor that links
authoritarianism and Islam.
However, most Middle East political scientists and scholars rejected the idea that culture
had anything to do with the persistence of authoritarianism in the region.27 As Lisa Anderson
states, scholars asserted that Islam was not a monolithic entity; its history demonstrated it to be
as tolerant and accommodating like Judaism and Christianity.28 She points out that followers of
Islam and other religions in general have interpreted them in different ways. Furthermore,
according to John L. Esposito, all religions, including Islam, have had various relations with
different kinds of governments, such as sultanates, democracy, republicanism and monarchy.29
This evidence indicates that Islam is much like other faiths in that it is capable of existing
alongside different kinds of governments at different times. Therefore, it is inaccurate to argue
that Islam is incompatible with democracy or any other form of government. The cultural
explanation ultimately fails to see the complexity of Middle East, which is as diverse as every
other region in the world, and Islam, which is equally varied.
Alternatively, some scholars have directed their attention to Middle Eastern institutions
instead of culture. Some have argued that the region’s lack of “democratic prerequisites” such as
strong civil societies, market-driven economies, high literacy rates and representational
government institutions accounts for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East.30
However, the fact that countries in the region possess a number of these so-called prerequisites

27

Anderson, 197.
Ibid.
29
Esposito, 144. Unholy War: Terror in the Name of Islam. New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.
30
Bellin, 139-141.
28
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challenges this idea. For example, several countries in the region have democratic institutions
such as parliaments, political parties, judiciaries and elections.
According to Marsha P. Posusney, there are two general types of institutions: formal
organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure political conduct.31 These include
political parties, government military/security agencies, different branches of government, and
elections and the rules that govern them.32 Stephen Cook (2005) argues that it is not a lack of
institutions in the region prevent democratic reform and development, rather, it is the flawed
“nature” of the institutions themselves that “tend to restrict political participation, limit
individual freedom, and vest overwhelming power in the executive branch of government.”33
For example, Cook states that in 2004 citizens of Qatar received greater freedoms in the new
constitution, but the royal family consolidated its absolute rule.
State manipulation of elections is perhaps the most apparent (and well documented in the
literature) means for authoritarian governments in the Middle East to maintain their positions in
power. Posusney illustrates this by describing contested, albeit largely controlled, parliamentary
elections throughout Middle East during the early 1960s to 2000.34 The preferred electoral
structure used in the region is a “winner takes all” system, where the party that wins the majority
of seats also gains the most power.35 In Egypt, party contested parliamentary elections began
under late president Anwar Sadat in 1976. However, according to Posusney, Sadat ensured that
the government-backed party would win the majority of the seats, which is what occurred. In
1984, president Hosni Mubarak led a new round a elections but the outcome remained the same:
the ruling party, which came to be known as the National Democratic Party, won the majority of
31

Posusney, 7. “The Middle East’s Democracy Deficit.”
Ibid.
33
Cook, Stephen, 96. “The Right Way to Promote Arab Reform,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. 2 (2005): 91-102.
34
Posusney, “Multiparty Elections in the Arab World.”
35
94.
32
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the seats, while only garnering 73% of the popular vote.36
According to Holger Albrecht and Oliver Schlumberger, in addition to parliaments and
elections, authoritarian regimes in the region have also established other institutions such as new
government ministries and institutions that arbitrate economic disputes.37 They have also
allowed the establishment of NGOs, parliaments to enact antitrust legislation, and a more open
and freer press.38 The effect of all of these, according to the authors, is the creation of the
appearance of democracy for both domestic and foreign audiences. For example, the authors
argue, allowing NGOs to operate creates the semblance of autonomous societal organization, and
allowing political parties to form creates the appearance of true political contestation. In short,
the establishment of institutions is a means and a strategy for authoritarian regimes in the Middle
East to claim to have enacted democratic reform when in reality it is more likely the projection
of an appearance of democracy.39
The third set of explanations for the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East—
the history of international relations with the region—is predominantly about the legacy of
foreign, primarily Western, interventionism in to the region during the 20th century and it is
directly related to the oil/rentier state literature, which will be discussed in detail shortly. Middle
Eastern oil was (and continues to be) of great geopolitical and economic importance for the
entire world. British businessman William Knox D’Arcy first discovered oil in modern day Iran
in 1908, but it was not until after World War II that oil would have a significant and long-lasting
impact in terms of the potential for democratic prospects in the Middle East.40 As will be

36

95-96.
Albrecht, Holger and Schlumberger, Oliver., 380. “‘Waiting for Godot’: Regime Change Without
Democratization in the Middle East,” International Political Science Review 25, no. 4 (2004): 371-392.
38
Ibid.
39
381.
40
Mitchell, 408.
37
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explored further in the chapter four, the Saudi Arabian experience is perhaps the most striking
illustration of this.
The oil/rentier state literature is the fourth category of explanations for the persistence of
authoritarianism in the Middle East. The literature in this category explores the possible linkages
between natural resources and regime type.41 In other words, scholars within this category
examine whether natural resources (such as oil or minerals) determine either democratic or
authoritarian political outcomes. Many of these scholars argue the latter. According to Terry
Lynn Karl, commodity-led growth causes institutional change within the state; natural resource
revenue, more so than any other factors, triggers these kinds of structural alterations.42 States
that undergo such changes are called rentier states.
The rentier state theory is as follows. According to the theory, rent is income that isn't
generated by the “productive” processes of a country—i.e., the wealth generated by a country's
everyday economic activities such as consumption (people's wages spent on consumer goods),
industrial output (manufactured goods to be sold and the profits earned), and taxation.43 Instead,
rent is income derived from “unproductive” sources: the monopoly ownership of land (by the
state or foreign companies) and the extraction and selling of natural resources, strategic rents

41

For example, see, Ross, Michael. “Does Oil Hinder Democracy?” World Politics 53, no. 3 (Apr., 2001): 325-361;
and, Dunning, Thad. Crude Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
42
Karl, 7.
43
Beblawi, 85-86. In The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith stated that there are three sources of income: rent, wages
and profits. Rent, according to Smith, is the income received from the property ownership of land—it is the money
earned from the leasing of the land for agricultural, mining, or other uses, and the profits from the sale of the natural
resources or food that are produced. In other words, the landowner does not actively work on it to receive a wage,
but is instead the recipient of a large share or most of the wealth. This type of wealth that accrues to the property
owner is called ‘unearned’ income and is the essential characteristic of rent. In classical economics, these
landowners were called ‘rentiers’ because, to reiterate, instead of working for a living wage, rentiers extracted a
‘rent’ from the profits of the work done on his property as well as the money paid for the use of the land. The onset
of enormous oil revenues in some Middle Eastern countries beginning with the oil shocks of the 1970s resurrected
the notion of ‘unearned income’ from classical economics. Scholars asserted that these revenues were a modern
manifestation of unearned income: oil revenue came to be seen as a kind of rent in the same manner as the rent that
accrued to property owners in classical economics.
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(such as land leased for military bases), foreign worker remittances, foreign aid, and others.
Thus the majority of rent comes from external sources.44
A rentier-state is a state in which its monopoly ownership of a resource determines the
nature of its politics.45 The rent revenue generated from monopoly ownership determines a
state’s political structures. According to the theory, rent income concentrates wealth towards the
state, which is the primary recipient and distributor of rent revenues.46 The state becomes
dependent on these revenues and this dependence fundamentally shifts its decision-making
process towards maintaining the extraction of rent income in the future.47 More to the point, the
infusion of rents, which are typically very large, allows the state to become relatively
autonomous from society. Therefore, the state leaders do not need to (or very minimally so)
extract income from society through taxation, and thus be held accountable by society. Their
economic independence—and the reliance upon official largesse by entire segments of society—
fosters the concentration of political power in the state.
This, then, gets to the core of the theory’s argument. The theory asserts that states can
only “democratize” when the ruler and his subjects bargain over taxes.48 This happens when the
state does not have any source of income to fund its operations other than the taxes it imposes on
its subjects. As a result, the state becomes reliant on its citizens and therefore must
accommodate their demands, which they express in representative, legislative bodies such as
parliaments. In other words, citizens accept taxation in exchange for representation in the state
and in this way society is able to hold the government accountable. This relationship is summed
up in the phrase “no representation without taxation.”
44

Mahdavy, 428.
Karl, 13.
46
Beblawi, 89.
47
Karl, 197.
48
Herb, 256.
45
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The state-society relationship is the opposite in rentier states. Society is not involved
with the production of national wealth and taxed very little or not at all. Therefore society has
little or no say in state decision-making. However, to offset any opposition or dissent towards
the state, rentier states create an apolitical and acquiescent society by providing free or
affordable social services in areas such as health care and education. Thus a rentier state bases
its authority and legitimacy on the redistribution rent wealth rather than taxation. In sum,
according to the theory, rent income is therefore deterministic: it shapes the politics of the state
by giving the state the financial autonomy to possess and wield political and economic power.
The state becomes powerful, authoritarian, and undemocratic as a result of all of these factors.
B. Analysis of the Literature
Lisa Anderson and the other scholars she cites in her article are correct to assert that the
culture argument is an insufficient explanation for the persistence of authoritarianism in the
region. As described earlier, proponents of this argument equate Middle Eastern culture with
Islam and thus view the Middle East as one homogenous, unchanging entity: an “Islamic
civilization.” The entire region is considered exceptional, unlike other parts of the world. By
equating culture with Islam, the culture explanation fails to understand the region’s complexity
in terms of its history and cultural and religious diversity. The Arabic language and Islam may
be the prevalent features of the Middle East, yet every country in the region possesses its own
Arabic dialect, particular history and cultural/ethnic makeup.
The examination of institutions in the Middle East is a more sound approach than the
focus on culture because its conclusions—that government institutions in the region are
undemocratic in nature; that elections have been manipulated; that governments have established
agencies and other state organizations as well allowing the space for political party formation;
and that give the overall appearance of democracy—are based on concrete examples such as the
14

manipulation of elections in Egypt described earlier. Indeed, flawed institutions do exist in the
region but these problems are certainly not limited to the Middle East. While they do shed light
on the tactics used by authoritarian regimes, by themselves, institutional explanations are not
sufficient reasons for the persistence of authoritarianism. Moreover, democracies often exhibit
the same detrimental political behavior of authoritarian regimes such as corruption and
manipulation of elections. Thus the Middle East is not exceptional in terms of flawed
institutions.
As for the rentier state theory, even though a number of scholars have challenged,
critiqued and reexamined it, it has been “the dominant theoretical paradigm in the study of
Middle Eastern monarchies”49 and continues to be so in the study of Middle Eastern political
economy and the persistence of authoritarianism in region. However, similar to the literature
that looks at culture, the oil/rentier state literature tends to simplify the complex reality of the
region’s history, the relationships between oil, society and the state, and the internal political
structures and dynamics of the authoritarian regimes in the Middle East.
There are two main limitations of the rentier state theory. The first is one is that the
theory does not look deeply at the process of natural resource production itself. This is
particularly evident in the development of the Saudi Arabian oil industry, which will be touched
on in Chapter IV. The other limitation is the claim that rent revenue alone determines state
structures and molds political outcomes, thereby largely freeing the state from societal demands
and giving it a high level of autonomy. The examinations of Saudi Arabia and Iran in the
following chapters illustrate why this point is problematic.
Columbia University professor Timothy Mitchell addresses the first limitation. He
contends that proponents of the rentier state theory tend not to discuss the historical background
49

Herb, 256.
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of the oil industry in the region nor the production, distribution and use of oil; the focus remains
mostly on the oil revenues that accrue to the state after the oil is sold on the market.50 This,
Mitchell argues, prevents scholars from examining “the flow of oil” and the centers of power
located within the process of oil production: where the sources of the undemocratic politics in
the Middle East stem from.51
According to Mitchell, the harnessing of fossil fuels, first from coal and then from oil,
resulted in both democratic and undemocratic politics. He argues that the production and use of
coal as a primary source of energy, along with other factors such as urbanization, facilitated the
beginning of what he calls the “collective life out of which late-nineteenth-century mass politics
developed.”52 Mitchell states that the flow of coal production involved large networks and
“main junctions” where large numbers of workers as well as large “concentrations of carbon
energy” were concentrated. As a result, coal workers had significant political power in the form
of strikes that occurred in Europe and the United States. Strikes forced industry leaders and their
allies in the government to accept welfare democracy and universal suffrage.53 Thus coal
production made possible the “forms of democracy that emerged in leading industrial nations by
the middle decades of the 20th century”.54
The switch to oil as the primary source of energy for the world after WWII, Mitchell
argues, significantly decreased worker mobilization (though not entirely) and hence the
possibility for democratic politics where oil production took place, particularly in the Middle
East. Oil production involves a smaller workforce, is pumped from the ground, and is more

50

Mitchell, 400. “Carbon Democracy.”
Ibid.
52
401. Before coal emerged as the primary source of energy for existence, people relied on solar energy from the
sun, which would grow the crops to feed themselves and their domestic animals, as well as trees used for fuel.
53
406.
54
421.
51
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easily transported than coal through pipelines, tanker shipping and other kinds of transportation.
As a result, according to Mitchell, the potential for oil strikes and the political demands
(including better working conditions, political constitutions, the right to unionize and form
political parties) that they call for, decreased. Additionally, after the war oil companies,
American and others, began to take control over the production and distribution of Middle
Eastern oil, maintaining control by limiting supply in order to keep profits high.55 The British
suppressed the oil worker strikes that did occur, such as in Iraq and Palestine. After the war in
Lebanon and, as will be discussed in the following chapters, in Saudi Arabia and Iran, the United
States used its political and economic power to force favorable oil producing conditions.56
The second limitation, the assertion that rent revenues alone shape state structures and
decision-making which gives the state its own agency and separates it from society, is
problematic as well. According to University of Pennsylvania professor Bob Jessop, a state is
comprised of a “core” of a “distinct
ensemble of multifunctional institutions and organizations whose socially acceptable function is
to define and enforce collectively binding decisions on the members of a society in the name of
their common interest of general will.”57
For Jessop, this definition acknowledges the general notion of the state as a “macro-political
organization” and the connections between it and society. The latter acknowledgement is
important for this thesis. According to Jessop, the state can never completely separate itself from
society and the boundaries between them are not clear; the state depends on numerous “micropolitical practices” spread out throughout society.58 Stephen Hertog expands on this notion in
his examination of state-society relations in Saudi Arabia. This will be discussed in detail in
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Chapter IV. To briefly note here, Hertog finds that the Saudi state extends its reach in to society
through numerous state agencies and organizations, and that lower levels of society can in fact
affect the outcomes of government policies. Furthermore, Jessop argues, state institutions are
shaped by the nature of past social formation processes. In other words, states are not formed in
a vacuum; they arise out of the social context from which they are formed and continue to be
shaped by society.
Timothy Mitchell echoes Jessop’s view of the state.59 Like Jessop, Mitchell argues that
the state and society are not two separate, distinct entities. Rather, the boundaries between them
are permeable and overlapping; society can shape the state and vice-versa. For example,
Mitchell discusses banking. National and international corporations, government treasuries,
multinational organizations like the World Bank, semipublic central banks (such as the U.S.
Federal Reserve) and others, are all interconnected. Therefore, Mitchell contends, it is
impossible to separate the financial realm from the public realm.60 However, according to
Mitchell, internal political processes of the modern state create the “effect” of a clear
“distinction” between state and society. Powerful actors, which include political and economic
actors, promote this distinction in order to maintain an existing political and social order that
allows them to retain their positions of influence and control.61 Thus the appearance of a
distinction between state and society “disguises” the relationships of power that are invested in
maintaining the existing system of governance.
In terms of this thesis, the relationship between the national oil companies (NOCs) in
Saudi Arabia and Iran and their respective governments is another example of the blurring of the
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lines between state and society. In a 2006 study62, Valerie Marcel finds that NOCs in the Middle
East have evolved from being primarily nationalistic enterprises towards more market-oriented
and international driven companies. However, because governments continue to own them, they
cannot operate like fully independent, international companies. As a result, governments have a
great amount of say in discussions about company policies and strategies.63
Mitchell and Jessop’s arguments are important to this thesis because they problematize
the supposed effects of oil—that oil revenues simply accrue to the state and help authoritarian
regimes remain in power; that oil wealth determines state structures (i.e., that a state will be
authoritarian); and the assertion that the state becomes largely autonomous and separate from
society. In terms of the first limitation, Mitchell reveals that oil production involves much more
than the profits the state receives; it involves a process in which certain actors maintain power
and control. Both Jessop and Mitchell provide strong theoretical arguments about state-society
relations that complicate the rentier state theory. They show that numerous linkages exist
between the state and society and that both shape and influence each other thus challenging a
major component of the theory.
Jessop and Mitchell both provide a basis on which to begin to examine the relationships
between oil, politics, society and the state in Saudi Arabia and Iran. Mitchell demonstrates that it
is essential for scholars to look beyond the profits of oil production and examine other factors
that may cause authoritarian persistence. He and Jessop show that the state-society boundaries
overlap. Thus in order to get to a deeper level of understanding of the factors that lead to and
sustain authoritarianism in both countries, it is necessary to move away from the rentier state
theory. Doing so will demonstrate that oil, though important, alone cannot account for Saudi
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Arabian and Iranian authoritarianism. The alternative explanatory variables proposed in this
thesis are:
•
•
•
•

Political Structures
Religion
History/Actions of External Actors
State Mechanisms and Strategies
As stated at the end of the introduction, this thesis contends that it is necessary to

examine the case studies externally and internally. The scholars reviewed in this chapter have
approached the issue of authoritarianism in the Middle East in this manner but questions still
remain: to what extent has the role that oil played beyond the notion that it is simply
redistributed?; what exactly were the effects of foreign interventionism in the region?; what are
the internal social, economic and political conditions within the case studies and how have they
contributed to the resilience of the Saudi and Iranian regimes?; and, are societies of rentier states
depoliticized as the theory assumes? The following chapters address all of these questions and
demonstrate that multi-causal factors account for the persistence of authoritarianism in the
Middle East, rather than one overall argument such as the rentier state theory.
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Chapter III: The Case of Iran
A. Historical Overview
Two monarchies ruled Iran prior to the 1979 Iranian Revolution. The Qajar Dynasty was
in power since its founding in 1796 until a senior military general, Reza Khan, orchestrated a
military coup in 1921 and crowned himself Shah (king) in 1926, establishing the Pahlavi
Dynasty.64 Reza Shah Pahlavi created a strong, centralized state based on two “pillars”: the
military and the bureaucracy, both of which he significantly expanded during his reign. He
aimed to widen the state’s reach into society and economy.65 Not surprisingly, tribal families,
Islamic clergy, and young intellectuals all opposed the Shah’s heavy-handed rule.66 The British
and Soviet invasion of Iran in 1941 (in order to secure access to oil during World War II)
terminated his reign and he abdicated the throne to his son Muhammad Reza.67
The first thirteen years of Muhammad Reza’s reign, known as the “nationalist
interregnum,” was a period of time when the Shah promised to rule as a constitutional monarch
rather than as a supreme leader like his father before him. The period also marked the rise of the
Tudeh Party, a socialist-democratic party that called for democratic reforms such as increased
political, civic and social liberties and legislation that would address the needs of the poor.68 It
also stressed the importance of Iranian national identity and called for the nationalization of the
oil industry. The party went into decline in late 1940s but its goals of mass mobilization and
mass politics would remain.
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The interregnum also witnessed the rise of the nationalist movement. Led by Prime
Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, the movement almost terminated the Pahlavi monarchy. Under
his leadership, in the spring of 1951 the Majlis passed a bill that nationalized Iran’s oil industry.
The government also established the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC). Nationalization
threatened British control of oil production and the United States worried that the unstable nature
of Iranian politics would lead to increased Soviet influence in Iran. These factors prompted the
British and Americans to remove Mosaddeq from power and reinstate the Shah, who had fled
Iran, in a coup in August, 1953. The coup delegitimized the rule of the Mohammad Reza and
permanently identified his reign with Britain and the United States.69
Back in power, the Shah launched his state modernization and expansion plans. The
military, the state bureaucracy and the system of court patronage that supplied the Shah with
supporters, all increased in size. In 1963, he initiated the White Revolution, a series of reforms
that aimed to improve the lives of Iranians. Land reform was its centerpiece. The goal was to
bring economic prosperity to Iran, make Iran powerful, and ultimately break the grip on power of
the landowning class in the countryside.70 Reforms also developed the industrial sector which
attracted workers to urban centers. Socially, the White Revolution brought about improvements
in education and health. The effect of the revolution was far reaching in that it led to economic
and social structural shifts: from agriculture to industry, countryside to town, and the political
power of landowning notables to the state.71
Oil revenues funded these reforms. The oil consortium agreement in 1954 resumed the
flow of oil royalties, which had been stalled for a couple of years, paid to the Iranian
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government.72 The 1973 Oil Shock dramatically increased Iran’s oil revenues, which reached to
twenty billion dollars in 1976.73 However, despite these increases and the gains achieved in the
White Revolution, Iranians overthrew the Shah in the Iranian Revolution of 1979. The Shah
failed to fully gain the support of the poorer classes: living conditions did not improve in the
countryside and the wealth gap between the poor and wealthy widened. He also alienated the
middle class and, importantly, the clergy who subsequently supported Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini, the leading Shi’a cleric in Iran who became the leader of the revolution.
According to the rentier state theory, the Iranian Revolution should not have happened
and the monarchy should have endured. Iran’s oil revenues in the 1970s were quite large, which,
by the theory’s reasoning, ought to have been sufficient to keep the regime in power. Terry
Lynn Karl (1997) argues that “petro-states,” countries in which oil is the dominant or significant
component of their economies, are inherently vulnerable because dependence on oil revenues,
especially during oil booms, weaken the administrative capacity of the state while at the same
time expanding state-led development.74 This means that as the state increasingly relies on oil
income for its revenues, as opposed to from taxes, the state loses its ability to make sound
economic regulatory decisions because it rules through public spending rather than smart
management of the economy.75 Thus Karl attributes the monarchy’s demise to its dependence on
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oil revenues and the destabilizing effects such dependence generates.76 This evidence suggests
that instead of creating stable regimes, oil contributes to government instability and structural
weakness. However the Iranian Revolution, discussed in more detail below, demonstrates that
oil cannot be the only factor that caused the instability that resulted in the Shah’s demise. The
Shah’s authoritarian methods, combined with the vast corruption and wastefulness of his regime
as well as the end of the oil boom in the latter years of the 1970s, played a far more decisive role
in fostering the massive revolution that toppled the Shah.
Some may argue that the current economic conditions in Iran are evidence that support
the theory as well. As for much of its recent history, the oil and natural gas industries dominate
the Iran’s economy. The state retains ownership of many of the large economic enterprises, such
as the oil industry, and according to current World Bank data, in 2009 the GDP of Iran was $331
billion and the share of oil revenues amounted to approximately 23.7% of GDP, down from
40.3% the previous year.77 As of 2010, oil revenues provided Iran with approximately half of
the government’s revenues and oil and its derivatives amounted to roughly 80% of Iran’s total
exports.78 Manufacturing, mining, agriculture, and technology sectors largely constitute the
remainder of the economy. The government is currently in the process of a five-year (20102015) privatization plan to diversify the economy but factors such as unemployment, falling and
unstable oil prices, large government subsidies, inefficient public sector enterprises, and foreign
economic sanctions have hampered this effort. Some may contend that that despite these
unfavorable conditions, especially the uncertainty in the global oil markets, the oil sector is what
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is enabling the regime to remain in power. As discussed in the next section, however, other
factors have played a significant role.
B. Regime Resilience: Mechanisms, Strategies and Political Structures of the Islamic Republic
The Iranian Revolution, which took place in February 1979, ushered in a new, but
different authoritarian regime.79 The revolution was a broadly based social uprising composed of
Ayotallah Ruhollah Khomeini and his clerical and non-clerical followers, constitutional liberals,
Marxists and other leftists, Iranian university students, women’s rights groups, urban poor, and
others. The Islamic clergy, led by Khomeini, was by far the most organized out of all the
revolutionary groups. By April 1979 they were able to outmaneuver the secular groups, which
were fragmented and did not possess a leader capable of matching Khomeini in stature and
leadership.80 On April 1st, 98% of Iranians approved the founding of an Islamic Republic in a
national referendum. In November, the Assembly of Experts, a 70-member body appointed by
Khomeini of supporters of the Islamist government, approved a new constitution which placed
the concept of “velayat-e faqeh” (the Guardianship of the Jurist; the notion that only senior
Islamic clerics possess the authority to rule the state) as the unifying ideology and basis for the
Islamic Republic.81 In other words, the constitution codified the authority of the clergy. As will
be discussed later in this chapter, this would play a crucial role for the new regime’s survival in
the coming decades.
The emergence of the Islamic Republic challenges the notion that oil revenue is the only
variable that directly shapes state formation. The discussion about the state-society relationship
towards the end of the previous chapter makes clear that many factors affect state structures.
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Sami Zubaida (1993) argues that scholars ought to examine Middle Eastern countries through the
socio-economic processes shape their politics and societies.82
Understanding the context in which the Iranian Revolution took place is an excellent
example of this. Although oil would remain a significant part of the Iranian economy after the
revolution, clerical Islam and the idea of a centralized Islamic Republic arose out of the complex
socio-economic and repressive context of the Pahlavi regime.83 The Iranian government under
the Shah directly controlled the press, trade unions and the legal system, and created the secret
police force called the Savak, which the government used to enforce its policies. Consequently,
the Shah alienated most parts of society, including and importantly, the Shi’a clergy who had
increasingly become subordinated to the modernization of the White Revolution.
Shi’ism in Iran was a significant part of the social fabric; it was deeply embedded within
Iranian society through mosques, religious schools called madrasas, seminaries and shrines.84
Additionally, the clergy received various forms of religious taxes (called zakat and khuns) and
income in to endowments (waqfs) from the traditional bazaar and devout Shi’a Muslims in return
for legal, educational and religious services.85 The educational, judicial, and economic reforms
of the White Revolution terminated most of the clergy’s traditional roles in these areas. For
example, the government attempted to appropriate some of the clergy’s influence by establishing
a ‘religion corps,’ which attempted to teach religion in the countryside.86 The government also
established theology as an academic discipline to challenge the influence of the seminaries and
extended “state control over the management of pious endowments”.87
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Before this transition, Shi’a clergy had generally accepted the role of a secular leader as
long as he allowed them to practice their faith in peace and as a result, most senior Shi’a clerics
called mujtahids stayed away from politics.88 However, the White Revolution and the repression
and corruption of the Pahlavi regime eventually served as the catalyst for increased Shi’a
activism, led by Khomeini. Khomeini was the most vocal opponent mujtahid of the Shah and by
1963 he assumed the role as the leading voice among the radical clergy that opposed the
regime.89 The government exiled in him in 1964 and in 1965 he moved to the third holiest city
in Shi’a Islam, Najaf, Iraq.
There, Khomeini crafted his vision of an Islamic government.90 He melded criticisms
and ideas of other radical Shi’a into one broad critique of the Pahlavi regime. Some of these
Shi’a clerics criticized the increased westernization, or “westoxification,” in Iran, which they
thought had gradually eroded Islamic culture, particularly the greater freedoms given to women
in terms of traditional customs.91 Other clerics argued that the clergy ought to be more socially
and politically active. Ultimately, Khomeini deeply believed in the concept of velayat-e faqeh
and was determined to establish an Islamic government, one that aimed to fully transform society
towards a more culturally Islamic way of life and serve as the unquestionable overseer of this
transition; he wanted a government that combined “Islamist-ideological and political power in
the service of an Islamist state.”92
Khomeini also incorporated into his vision social, political and economic criticisms of the
regime that all Iranians could agree on. In addition to the corruption and repression that
characterized the government, he condemned the Shah’s absolute rule and often disregard of the
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constitution. Khomeini denounced the regime’s close and compliant role to foreign interests
during the Cold War which, for Iranians, violated their country’s national sovereignty.93 Other
criticisms included: the excessive amounts of money allocated towards the military; failing to
develop the agricultural sector; failing to develop sufficient social services in rural areas; failing
to protect the bazaar from foreigners and state-connected entrepreneurs; and, failing to address
general problems of crime and drug addiction.94
The emergence of the Islamic Republic and the formation of its state structures thus had
less to do with oil than with Muhammad Reza Shah’s regime. The Shah ought to have been able
to stay in power with the oil revenues at his disposal but this does not account for the decades of
repressive rule and mismanagement that undermined his authority. This does not suggest that oil
was irrelevant but it does suggest that oil revenue on its own is not a sufficient predictor of
regime stability. Moreover, foreign control of oil production in Iran foreign involvement in
Iranian politics post-1951 was consistently a sore point for Iranians and a liability for the Shah.
Some Iranian oil professionals complained that the compensation they were required to pay to
foreign companies was far too high.95 Ultimately, the mutual relationship between foreign
interests and the Shah was the most serious grievance many Iranians held against the monarchy;
it was an affront to Iranian sovereignty.
The White Revolution thus indirectly fostered the rise of politically active Shi’ism in
Iran. Until the early 1960s, the clergy was generally acquiescent and reactive to the political
environment around them and its politics had been primarily internal amongst clerics themselves
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and religious institutions.96 As described above, this changed when Khomeini began to publicly
and fervently denounce the Shah. After the revolution, it was Khomeini and other members of
the new government who shaped the political structures of the Islamic Republic.
Despite an overwhelming revolution in which large portions of society supported the
ouster of the Pahlavi regime, the new government’s grip on to power was tenuous, particularly
during the period immediately after the overthrow in which the new constitution was drafted.
Neither the clergy nor the opposition possessed a precise vision as to what the government of an
Islamic Republic would be; the rhetoric of the revolution consisted of mostly broad notions of
social justice, liberty, independence and of the idea of a nation based on Islamic ideals and
laws.97 However, there were sharp differences between, on the one hand Khomeini and his
supporters who comprised the newly formed Islamic Republic Party, and on the other hand, the
prime minister, Mehdi Bazargan and other members of the Provisional Government.98 Khomeini
and his faction wanted to institutionalize Islam whereas Barzagan and the other nationalists
preferred a secular, democratic constitution based on Islamic principles.99
By the end of 1982, however, the clergy consolidated its power by defeating the leftistsecular elements of the revolution and the new government was firmly in control.100 The Iranian
government emerged essentially as a hybrid political regime. It can be described as a theocratic
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republic, consisting of a ‘shadow’ clerical side and an official side to the government.101 In
terms of the former, the preamble and Article 4 of the new constitution both placed Shari’a law
as the unifying ideology and basis for the Islamic Republic.102 This was encapsulated in the
aforementioned concept of velayat-e faqih, which declares that the Iranian government not only
be based on Sharia’a law, but that in order for this to be successful, a leading Islamic jurist, the
Ayatollah, who is to be appointed by the Assembly Experts, must provide political
‘guardianship’ over the people. The assembly appointed Khomeini. Furthermore, the
constitution founded the very powerful Guardian Council, the body of twelve Islamic jurists
given the task of interpreting the constitution, ensuring that any new legislation adheres to
Islamic law, and overseeing the elections of as well as approving the candidates to parliament,
the presidency, and the Assembly of Experts.
Although Islamic law takes precedence in the constitution, the constitution itself is
primarily non-Islamic.103 It is actually based on the French government established by Charles
de Gaulle, the Fifth Republic. As such, the constitution divides government into branches: the
executive, the national parliament and the judiciary. The government itself is highly
centralized.104 The president was defined as the chief executive, second only to the Supreme
Leader, and was in charge of his cabinet, appointing officials to various ministries as well as
ambassadors, governors and mayors.105 The Majlis consists of 270 elected representatives who
craft legislation, approve the president’s appointment of ministers, as well as several other duties
too long to list here. The Supreme Court and regional and local courts, and the Ministry of
Justice, which is headed by the Attorney General, compose judiciary branch of government in
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Iran.106 Above all, however, the ultimate authority of the government lies with the Supreme
Leader.
The dual, or hybrid, nature of the government—republican and theocratic—has played an
essential role in maintaining the regimes’ longevity and hence authoritarianism in Iran. One
mechanism for regime maintenance is the regime’s fostering of elite factionalism and
contestation within the government. This allows for “differences to emerge and persist but
simultaneously prevents the aggregation of interests” that would challenge the authority of the
clergy and bring about a transition to democracy.107 Contrary to some democratization literature,
which argues that elite factionalism and confrontation is a prerequisite for democratic transition,
Iran’s case demonstrates that elite factionalism does not always lead to the downfall of
authoritarianism.108
The origins of elite fragmentation stem from the highly diverse composition of the
revolutionary movement and the dual nature of the government that emerged from it.109 In other
words, competition between different groups not only became a central characteristic of the new
government (as it is in almost every kind of government), the competition in itself is one factor
that enables the regime to survive. In fact, even though the regime often repressed dissent
through censoring the media, its structure allows for political space for criticism from both
clerical and even secular dissent.110
From the very outset of the establishment of the Islamic Republic significant differences
existed between elite conservative and reformist factions who argued over the socio-economic
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policies the government ought to pursue. Bazargan and his camp argued for conservative
reforms. For them, and later a small but powerful coalition of clergy, the economy needed
moderate reforms; the government only needed to create a space for the private sector to flourish
and not intervene in it.111 Additionally, they asserted that the government ought to protect and
respect property rights, and only nationalize large industries or companies when the national
interest of the country was at stake.112 The reformists comprised the opposing camp, led the first
president of the Islamic Republic, Abolhasan Bani Sadr. They called for an interventionist
government that would regulate the economy and thereby place restrictions on property rights.
They argued that Islamic economic principles ought to be interpreted according to modern times
and not strictly adhere to Shari’a law; they believed that capitalism and Shari’a law could in fact
compatible.113 Unfortunately for Sadr and other like-minded officials, the clergy gradually
asserted its control of the government through the crafting of the constitution, which gave them
ultimate control of the economy and other areas such as education, the media, and the legal
system.114 The debates between the conservatives and reformists continued in the next decades
and continue today.115
Elite political contestation grew significantly after the revolution and gradually became
institutionalized within the structure of the government.116 The government increased the state
bureaucracy by expanding existing ministries and other institutions such as the aforementioned
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religious foundations, which are only accountable to the Supreme Leader.117 As a result, the
Iranian government consists of a large array of government organizations. Many of these
institutions are extremely large (reaching up to hundreds of thousands of people), possess their
own administrative structures and employees, and have created their own institutional cultures
that further promote divisions with other institutions.118 These institutions are also places where
politicians, technocrats and intellectuals can produce policy ideas and criticize the government or
other institutions. Importantly, because the government is so highly fragmented and has
elections that occur regularly, these institutions are able to “regenerate” elites themselves.119
Those elites that lose elections are not expelled but continue to work in the government either in
the same organization or in other institutions. This helps ensure that no one elite faction
achieves dominance because elites cannot fully sideline and isolate opposing groups.
Along with elite factionalism, the Islamic authority codified in the constitution is another
characteristic of the hybrid government and it is perhaps the most consequential and decisive
factor that has enabled the Iranian regime to remain in power. At all levels of the official
government there are corresponding non-elected bodies comprised of clerics that have the
authority to overrule policies of the former. The clergy thus possessed and continue to hold the
upper hand when it comes to policy-making. The conflicts between the Majlis and the Guardian
Council which, to reiterate, is required by the constitution to approve of the legislation produced
by the Majlis, illustrates this well in the 1980s and then later in the 1990s and early 2000s.120
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In 1989, the Iranian government passed a series of constitutional amendments that further
solidified its rule. It made the transition from an Islamic government based on Shi’a tradition,
which stressed the “dualism of religious and political authority,” towards a more centralized
theocratic state of “collective conciliar rule by clerical elite.”121 The Supreme Leader, of course,
remained at the apex of this government and essentially came to possess the same power of a
sultan or caliph and who would be to rule in order to serve the interest of the public.122
Additionally, in order to finally end the constant legislative tussles between Majlis and the
Guardian Council, Khomeini appointed a new regulatory body to the executive branch called the
Expediency Council. It is comprised of clerics appointed by the Supreme Leader, including the
six clerical jurists of the Guardian Council, but also includes the president and the prime
minister. Its original purpose was to mediate and resolve the differences between the Guardian
Council and the Majlis and not, as Khomeini wanted, become a third center of power and another
group dominated by clergy.123
However, the Expediency Council became just that and more, eventually becoming a
full-fledged legislative body that could directly shape government policies. It did this by
addressing and amending legislative bills that the Guardian Council and the Majlis did not
disagree on; in 1993 the Guardian Council officially decreed that no legislative body could
overrule decisions of the Expediency Council. The combination of the Expediency and Guardian
Councils and the increased power of the Supreme Leader relegated the Majlis to being primarily
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a “consultative body with limited legislative authority.”124 Thus at the end of Khomeini’s life,
clerical rule became institutionalized and secure.
The Islamic Republic further solidified its authority after the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq
War (1980-1988).125 Particularly in its early years, the war was crucial for the newly established
regime. Iranians, even those who disliked the regime, rallied around the government with
nationalistic, patriotic fervor.126 The regime linked this sentiment with religion, thereby creating
a nationalistic narrative to the revolution itself. In other words, the war provided the regime with
an opportunity to strengthen its power by linking Islam, which the regime used to justify its
authority, with the potent upsurge of Iranian nationalism.127 The war was also a catalyst for state
expansion in a wide range of areas. For example, the government increased the size of the
military, established new government ministries, censored the media, and promoted Islam in
various forms.128 The regime’s coupling of religion and nationalism thus served as further
justification for expanding and consolidating its power. In this instance, a kind of “cultural
religious-nationalism,” so to speak, functioned as an effective and powerful force that the regime
could tap into to help strengthen its authority and inspire soldiers going into battle.
The war wreaked havoc upon the Iranian economy. In the first half of the 1980s oil
revenue was plentiful, amounting to roughly $75 billion in revenue.129 By the middle of the
decade, however, the Iranian economy began to struggle and went into decline. The war proved
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costly both in lives and treasure, and oil prices fell in the middle of the decade down to $6 billion
in 1986, which resulted in serious restrictions on the regime and the economy.130 Tax revenue
fell, the economy contracted, the budget deficit rose, and consumer imports the population
depended on declined. Poverty affected 65-70% of the population and the unemployment rate
reached 15% by 1989. There was not enough housing for the increasing population and the
health care system suffered from a lack of resources for much of the healthcare workforce.
(Amirahmadi, 293-394)
The conservative establishment, by then firmly in place, was able to not only withstand
these economic challenges but was also able to enact economic reforms to address the problems
described above while limiting and obstructing the implementation of liberal socio-political
reforms. The new pragmatist president elected in 1989, Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and the
newly appointed Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyed Ali Khameini, quickly implemented liberal
economic reforms to open up the economy, including the privatization of nationalized
enterprises, the decontrolling of prices, and the elimination of subsidies.131 They also initiated
first of several Five-Year Plans, a big part of which provided over twenty-five billion dollars in
foreign investment132, opened five free trade zones, and reduced the size of the defense
budget.133 Rafsanjani hoped these and other measures would lead to economic growth and
ultimately a free-market system.134 Conservatives in the government, particularly conservative
clerics, applauded and supported these economic policies. In order to pass these reforms,
Rafsanjani aligned himself with them, and, with the help of the Guardian Council which had the
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authority to disqualify parliamentary candidates, was able to sideline leftists in the Majlis who
advocated for strong government intervention in the economy.
However, gaining the support of the clerics and other conservatives came at a cost: it
gradually forced Rafsanjani to essentially abandon his social and political reforms, which he
considered essential for promoting economic development. He did achieve some of these
reforms, such as the expansion of higher education, the relaxation of restrictions on the press,
music and film industry, the establishment of several women’s organizations, and the
development of civil society.135 Beyond these however, the conservatives blocked his other
socio-political reforms. Furthermore, the Majlis as well as Khameini and the members of the
Guardian Council also began to oppose Rafsanjani’s economic policies. For example,
Rafsanjani wanted to emulate China’s economic model of development. This would have
entailed changes such as reducing subsidies for food, fuel and gasoline; reducing financial
support for and supervising of clerical economic foundations called bonyads136; privatizing
nationalized companies; allowing increased foreign capital investment; and granting territorial
concessions to foreign oil companies.137 According to the conservatives, these policies would
have gone against revolutionary principles and values.
The election of reformist President Mohammad Khatami in 1997 proved to be a
significant challenge to the conservative establishment. He and other participants of the reform
movement, as it became known, wanted to transform the Islamic Republic in a manner that
would maintain its Islamic character while adopting democratic political and social reforms.
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Reformists, a large majority of whom were young people, most notably young women, wanted
political pluralism (the government banned the formation of political parties), economic growth
and the development of civil society. In short, they wanted to restructure the government—
Iran’s own perestroika.138 Specifically, the called for increased “personal freedoms, social
justice, privacy, tolerance, public participation in the affairs of the state, consolidation of the rule
of law, an open and free press, transparency in government, accountability and an end to
corruption.”139 Khatami appeared to be the perfect leader of the movement since, as an educated
and open-minded intellectual who studied Western thought and history, he embodied the
democratic values held by the reformists. His election signified a clear repudiation of Iranian
authoritarianism and demonstrated that Iranians wanted change of the status quo and ultimately
democracy.140
The reformists buttressed Khatami’s presidential win with victories in local elections in
1999, the 2000 parliamentary elections, and reelecting him to a second term in 2001. These
victories, along with rising oil prices, enabled him to pursue the reformist agenda described
above. The government under Khatami allocated oil revenues to develop medical facilities,
education, housing, infrastructure (electrical, water), and nuclear installations.141 As a result,
literacy rates increased, mortality rates dropped significantly, and the percentage of female
university and college students rose. The Majlis passed over one-hundred reforms bills, many of
which dealt with the judicial system.142 Additionally, Khatami also made efforts to improve the
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image of Iran abroad, such as travelling to several countries, hosting a human rights conference,
and even accepted a two-state solution in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Despite these gains, the constitutionally granted authority given to the clergy ultimately
prevented the reform movement from breaking the authoritarian rule of the clerical
establishment. The clergy and their conservative allies employed a broad, long-term strategy in
order to contain and counter the momentum towards reform; the reformists may have won
elections but their agenda could be stymied in the future.143 The clergy’s control of the main
government institutions, namely, the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the
judiciary was their greatest strength.
Khatami’s presidency illustrates this point well. In 1998, he appointed the Commission
of the Implementation and Supervision of the Constitution. Article 113 of the original draft of
the Constitution grants the president the authority to safeguard and implement the constitution.
The commission’s purpose was to advise Khatami on how to interpret article 113 in order to
increase the power of the executive office and weaken the grip on to power possessed by the
clerical establishment. For example, Khatami attempted to challenge the Guardian Council’s
authority to disqualify parliamentary candidates and shift the Council’s authority of supervising
elections to the interior ministry.144 He also had the opportunity to confront the Judiciary.
However, the clergy were too powerful and prevented Khatami from achieving these goals.145
The clergy and their conservative allies engaged in a variety of other legal or oftentimes
violent and repressive strategies in order to stymie the reform movement. In 1998, the
conservatives orchestrated the impeachment of Adollah Nuri, the minister of the interior, one of
Khatami’s most important reformist allies. Nuri’s removal signaled to the conservatives that
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they could be successful in their effort to counter the reformist agenda.146 The Guardian Council
continued to veto the majority of reform bills passed in the Majlis and also increased their effort
to disqualify parliamentary candidates. In other instances the Council reviewed legislation that
had little to do with adhering to Islamic principles such as in 2001 when the Expediency Council
supported the Guardian Council’s rejection of the budget passed by the Majlis.147 In terms of
repressive measures employed by the conservatives, the judiciary forced the closure of dozens of
reformist-leaning newspapers and arrested intellectuals who criticized the regime or Islam or
both. The conservatives also used the muscle of the Revolutionary Guards148 and organized
vigilante militias called the basij to tamp down anti-government organizing or protests, such as a
protest gathering at Tehran University.149
Eventually, the pressure from the conservatives within the regime proved to be strong for
reform movement. This, and the fact that Khatami himself was, as many of his supporters
complained, too passive and compromising in his leadership.150 As a result, Khatami lost much
of his support, most of whom became disillusioned and apathetic with the reform movement and
politics in general. However, Khatami became president in a context in which unelected
bodies—the Guardian Council, the Expediency Council, and the judiciary—essentially dictated
government policy-making, and in which the government’s ideological institutions and
repressive security apparatuses all blocked the reform movement.151
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The failure of the reform movement coincided with a continuing faltering economy that
was still dependent on oil revenues, and it led to conservative electoral victories between 2003
and 2005, that latter being the election of the conservative-populist president Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad. In the June 2009, presidential election aspirations for democratic reform rose
once again. Former prime minister (1981-1989) Mir Hussein Mousavi ran against Ahmadinejad
as a reformist candidate. Mousavi did not win but it was widely accepted that the election was
rigged in favor of Ahmadinejad. This sparked protests called the ‘green movement’, but the
regime deployed the police and basij militias to violently suppress the movement, effectively
eliminating the threat to the regime’s power.
This examination of Iran demonstrates that both external and particularly internal factors
contributed to the persistence of authoritarianism in Iran. This chapter therefore presents a more
nuanced explanation as to why this has been the case rather than focusing on Iranian oil. The
Shah’s record as Iran’s monarch as perhaps the key factor that led to his demise and the
emergence of the Islamic Republic and thus the continuation of authoritarianism in Iran. Iraq’s
invasion in 1980 was an immediate boost to the new regime. The regime took advantage of the
patriotic fervor that erupted and developed a nationalistic-religious narrative that it could use to
legitimize and widen its authority. The elite factionalism and the constitutionally granted
authority of the clergy are also essential factors. The former kept any aggregation of interests at
bay that could challenge the clergy for power and the latter has prevented fundamental
democratic reforms from taking place.
Oil revenues were and continue to be an integral component of the Iranian economy and
an important source of revenue for the Islamic Republic. They, however, cannot entirely account
for the political context in Iran since the revolution in 1979. As explored in this chapter, the

41

political structures of the Islamic Republic arose out of the complex social, political and
economic context of the Pahlavi regime. Once in place, the new government used different
mechanisms and strategies to maintain its hold on to power.
C. Enduring Authoritarianism in Iran and the ‘Arab Spring’
The Arab Spring, the ongoing (as of this writing, March 2012) revolutionary wave of
protests in the Middle East that began in late December 2010, has witnessed protests calling for
democratic reform across the region and the toppling of authoritarian regimes in Tunisia, Libya,
and Egypt. It remains to be seen whether those successful revolutions will result in the
emergence of real democratic outcomes152 and the Arab Spring thus far has failed to make any
kind of real dent in the Iranian regime, much less toppling it. So, the important questions to
explore at this stage are: what does the Arab Spring tell us about the persistence of
authoritarianism in Iran, and, does the plentiful supply of oil revenue sufficiently explain the
regime’s continued survival in the face of regional upheaval?
Despite the uprisings in 2009, the Iranian regime has stayed in power and been largely
bypassed by the events of 2011. On the surface, these facts would seem to validate the rentier
state theory since Iran is an authoritarian oil-producing country. However, the Islamic
Republic’s continuing resilience has more to do with the evidence presented in this chapter than
the argument of the rentier state theory. To be sure, the Iranian government invests its oil
revenues in various ways to help maintain its position in power, including funding a powerful
security apparatus153 to clamp down on all anti-government protests. It has been argued that
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security apparatuses in the Middle East distinguish the region from other factors that contribute
to the persistence of authoritarianism.154 In other words, authoritarian governments, like Iran and
Saudi Arabia, remain in power because they employ their oil-funded security apparatuses to
crush dissent. However, oil alone cannot account for the persistence of authoritarianism in Iran.
The 2009 presidential election illustrates this point well but before discussing how, it is
necessary to review the election itself. As with the previous presidential campaigns since the late
1990s, the 2009 election was about what kind of government ought to preside over Iran. Once
again, it pitted Islamists vs. reformists. The election was about a fundamental choice between a
continuation of Islamic authoritarian rule and the beginning of a truly democratic state.
Ahmadinejad advocated for a continuation of his populist policies that benefitted the urban and
rural poor as well as government workers. The reformist candidate, Mousavi, campaigned,
among other issues, for increased economic liberalization and less government control of the
economy. The middle and upper classes as well as large segments of the youth population were
his main supporters.
Discontent with an authoritarian government was a major reason in galvanizing support
for the opposition movement but socioeconomic factors, such as the decrease in oil prices, the
global economic recession and high unemployment played a role as well. The roots of the green
movement however can be traced back to the previous one hundred years of Iranian
constitutionalism.155 Iranians have demanded more representative governments on many
occasions and it is this sentiment that led to the overthrow of the Pahlavi monarchy, the
democratic reform movement in the late 1990s and most recently the 2009 protests. The
immediate cause of the 2009 protests after the election was the widespread belief among many
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Iranians and foreign observers that the reelection of Ahmadinejad was fraudulent.156
Some of the same factors that account for authoritarianism in Iran discussed in this
chapter help explain why the government withstood the election protests. The Iranian
government’s political structures is one crucial factor. When one examines the political context
of the election closely and the government structures of Iran, it is apparent that the
constitutionally granted authority of the clergy places the conservatives in the government at a
significant advantage. If considered by itself, the successful government crackdown of the
protests would add weight to the rentier state theory, since, as noted above, it asserts that regimes
oil revenues contribute to the creation and maintenance of a security apparatus. While this is
certainly true, the fact is that ideas matter as well, and in this instance, a great deal. The
conservatives are at the helm of the government and they have support among key sectors of
society precisely because of their religious and nationalist vision. Additionally, controlling the
government gives them the control of “key instruments of power”: the military, the state media,
the judiciary and the aforementioned bonyads.157 They also, of course, control the NIOC158,
which supplies the government with a key source of income. All are powerful tools that provide
the regime with a significant amount of control over society and enable it to withstand challenges
to its authority.
Furthermore, the role of religion in the 2009 election and after is important, and reflects
how revolutionary Shi’ism has helped sustain the current regime during the last three decades.
As standard bearer and protector of Shi’a Islam, the Iranian government not only has had a
significant constitutional advantage in controlling important institutions as well as in blocking
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the previous reform efforts led by Khatami, it also has been able to generate significant amounts
of political support among devout Muslims and urban and rural poor by promoting and
advocating Islamic revolutionary principles and values. Thus, the regime has been able to tap
into the deeply entrenched cultural/religious reservoir of Iranian society to obtain support on
various occasions. As described earlier, this was important during the Iran-Iraq War. It was also
a significant factor during the Ahmadinejad’s election campaign in 2005 as well as in 2009. In
both elections, he promised to invest oil revenues into programs to fight poverty and promote
social justice, two important elements of revolutionary ideology. As a result, even if there were
widespread electoral fraud during the 2009 election in his favor, Ahmadinejad still garnered a
significant amount of support from a large swath of society, which gave his election and the
regime legitimacy to rule in the eyes of many Iranians.
The factors described above explain why the Islamic Republic has been able to endure
the Arab Spring, and, ultimately why authoritarianism persists in Iran. Iran’s oil plays a major
role in supporting the regime, but, on its own, is not a sufficient explanatory variable to really
capture the country’s external and internal contexts. The Iranian government is highly complex
and fractured, with different interests vying for different aims. Elite factionalism within the
government, the prominence of religious belief and conservatism in Iranian society, and the fact
that the clergy is at the apex of the government’s political structures, are some of Iran’s key
features that have contributed to the regime’s survival. They are also the same factors that, thus
far, have stymied the Arab Spring from making a real impact in Iran. Therefore it is inaccurate
to assert that the Arab Spring has failed to bring about fundamental change to Iran simply
because of oil. There is simply more to the picture than this.
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Chapter IV: The Case of Saudi Arabia
A. Historical Overview
On the surface, the reason for the persistence of authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia is
simple: it is ruled by an authoritarian government, a monarchy, and possesses abundant amounts
of oil. In fact, it is perhaps the best example of what a rentier state should look like. To be sure,
oil has had a tremendous impact on the Saudi state and society. Yet, similar to the Iranian case,
focusing on oil tends to exclude significant variables—the state’s political structures, the
monarchy’s reemphasis of its Islamic character and that of the country in 1979, and the SaudiAmerican relationship—that have contributed to the monarchy’s staying power. Before delving
into these areas, it is necessary to describe Saudi Arabia’s modern history in order to understand
the context in which they will be explored.
Saudi Arabia was officially formalized in 1932 as constitutional monarchy. However, as
mentioned in Chapter II, its more accurate origination dates back to 1915 when the British and
leader of the Al-Saud emirate Najd159, Abd al-Aziz al-Saud (more commonly known to
foreigners as Ibn Saud), signed a pact. Ibn Saud agreed to give up sovereignty rights for British
protection from other emirates that also were vying for regional dominance.160 In return, the
British supported his conquest of other emirates because they thought he would be a reliable
client and this would expand the influence (and territory) of the British Empire. As a result,
Saudi Arabia effectively became a client state, dependent on Britain for protection, despite an
earlier agreement (1927) recognizing Saudi Arabia’s independence.
The United States eventually replaced Britain as Saudi Arabia’s protector and
guaranteeor of sovereignty. ARAMCO (Arabian American Oil Company) discovered oil in
An emirate is a relatively small political territory ruled by a Muslim prince called an emir. Najd is located in the
center of the peninsula.
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Saudi Arabia 1933 and began drilling two years later at Dhahran, a city located in the eastern
portion of Saudi Arabia called the Eastern Province. During WWII and afterwards oil proved to
be a critical natural resource for the world’s economies and militaries. For the United States, oil
powered the American military and the American economy. Securing its supply was thus
critically important to U.S. economic and strategic interests.161 The United State’s sought to
secure future access to Saudi oil by strengthening its ties with the Saudi Arabia. It did this by
various means such as building a military airfield at Dhahran in 1943, the use of which was
important for the U.S. military during the Korean War in the 1950’s, and increased economic
aid. The ties between Saudi Arabia and the United States continued to be strong during the next
several decades, even after ownership of ARAMCO gradually transitioned to the Saudi
government. The Saudi’s attained full control in 1988 and changed the name of the company to
Saudi Aramco.
Foreign interest in oil was not the only consequential characteristic of Saudi Arabia’s
history that shaped the country’s political structures, society and future. According to Toby
Jones (2010), the monarchy’s decision after WWII to gain control over the environment—water
and land—was equally significant. Being a mostly arid country, Saudi Arabia possesses little
arable land, forcing the government to import food and water. The only arable lands are those
that surround oases, which were dispersed throughout the country. However, the eastern portion
of Saudi Arabia, the Eastern Province, contains an abundance of oases. The al-Hasa and Qatif
oases are the largest of these.
The monarchy recognized that control of the environment would enable it consolidate its
political power and sustain its rule—whoever controlled the Eastern Province and its resources
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would have the ability to control the people who depended on the life sustaining resources there.
Accomplishing these objectives would ensure sources from which to collect taxes, ensure a
supply of labor, safeguard national security, increase food production and establish control over
people’s use of land.162 For example, the government constructed the al-Hasa Irrigation and
Drainage Project (IDP) between 1964-1971 to irrigate lands containing two million date-palm
trees.163 For various reasons, including a considerable decrease in water levels, the project failed
to reach its goal of increasing the amount agricultural output, though it was a means through
which the state firmly asserted itself in the region. The project had an enormous impact on the
socio-economic conditions in the al-Hasa oasis, the only area in the kingdom where Shi’a and
Sunni Muslims lived together. The IDP project and its ramifications are discussed further in the
next section.
In addition to taming the environment, economic development, social growth, and
modernization also concerned the monarchy. It largely achieved these goals by the 1970s. The
monarchy established new government institutions such as the Ministry of Defense and Civil
Aviation and Ministry of Interior, and increased the overall size of the state bureaucracy.164 It
also invested state funds in industrialization, education, and in social services such as hospitals
and social security. By 1973, Saudi Arabia had become an interventionist state; a welfare state; a
liberal state (in terms of favoring the merchant class in the traditional merchant towns located in
the western province, the Hijaz, and ARAMCO’s operations in the Eastern Province); and an
authoritarian state.165 Crucially, the business class and the states’ fiscal administration forged
economic linkages with each other, creating networks through which the government collected
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and managed information about the economy and thus properly redistribute resources throughout
the country based on the information it gathered.166 In other words, the state learned how to
regulate the economy efficiently.
However, the massive revenues Saudi Arabia received during the Oil Boom years
resulted in the scaling back of sound economic regulation and the dismantling of decades of
modernization. Before the boom years in the 1960s, world crude oil prices were approximately
$5 per barrel but by 1980 they reached to $40 per barrel (prices increased in 1973 as a result of
the OPEC imposed Arab Oil Embargo, which was a reaction to the American support for Israel
during the Yom Kippur War).167 During this period, Saudi Arabia accrued over one hundred
billion dollars in oil revenues by 1980. As a result, the state’s economic policy shifted from one
of redistribution of taxes to one of distribution oil revenues in the form of real estate, industry,
agriculture and social service subsidies.168 The discontinuation of the states’ economic
regulatory capacity terminated the source of legitimacy (modernization) it had depended on for
decades prior to the oil boom.169 The oil boom, then, augmented Saudi Arabia’s ‘rentier’
characteristics and, for many, solidified the perception of Saudi Arabia as simply a state whose
authoritarian rule was and continues to be, based primarily on oil revenues.
The current state of the economy reflects this perception. As stated earlier, the oil
industry is by far the largest sector in the Saudi Arabian economy. According to the U.S. Energy
Information Administration, as of 2010, Saudi Arabia is the largest producer and exporter of
petroleum liquids in the world and possesses one-fifth of the world’s proven oil reserves. Saudi
Arabia’s GDP in 2010 was $434.6 billion and oil export revenues have generally amounted to
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80-90% of Saudi revenues and 40-50% of GDP in recent years.170 The monarchy has initiated
privatization measures in order to diversify the Saudi economy in areas such as
telecommunications and natural gas and it is also developing nuclear power. In light of this
information, it is apparent that Saudi Arabia is heavily dependent on its oil reserves. However,
the next section will demonstrate that many factors contribute to the monarchy’s resilience.
B. Regime Resilience: Mechanisms, Strategies and Political Structures of the Saudi State
By viewing Saudi Arabia as only an oil producing country, there is a tendency to
overlook other important factors including its internal social, economic, and political conditions.
The political structures of the Saudi monarchy is one such factor. Examining these structures
sheds light on the relationship between oil, politics and society in Saudi Arabia and complicates
two important claims of the rentier state theory—namely, that oil revenues alone shape political
structures, and that governments dependent on oil revenues (or other ‘rent’ income) are to a large
degree autonomous from society. According to Herb (1999), the Saudi state has survived
because it is a ‘dynastic monarchy,’ of which there are several in the Gulf region including Qatar
and Kuwait. Herb defines a dynastic monarchy as a government ruled by a royal family, whose
members occupy senior government positions, such as those in ministries and cabinets, as well as
lower level leadership positions throughout the government.
Family consensus decides the succession of rule in dynastic monarchies. This consensusmaking process entails a large amount of bargaining.171 The king retains and ensures his
authority by securing the support of certain family members, specifically sheiks and princes, in
return for appointments in senior bureaucratic posts in the state, such as in the aforementioned
ministries and cabinets. High-ranking family members bargain with the aspiring ruler for these
170
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positions and in return they support him. The amount and extent of bargaining within the family
increased significantly when the size of state grew after the discovery of oil, as family members
vied for leadership posts in the new state institutions.
The distribution of these and other government positions of authority to members of the
royal family, as well as the succession of rule process, are essential mechanisms that have
enabled the Saudi monarchy to maintain its hold on to power.172 Limiting these positions to the
family ensures that the family retains control of the state bureaucracy. These procedures also
restrict policy or succession of rule disagreements to within the family and prevent internal
fracturing which may threaten the ruler’s authority and that of the monarchy itself.173 The family
discusses and resolves any problems or issues without the interference of those outside it who
may want to challenge its absolute rule. All of these factors guarantee that the royal family
maintains control of Saudi Arabia.
Furthermore, it is essential to state here that these political conditions—a dynastic
monarchy where positions of authority are allotted to family members and where the family
adheres to a strict hierarchy—existed before the discovery of oil in Saudi Arabia and have
remained in tact ever since. Saudi culture, therefore, shaped the structures of the Saudi
monarchy rather than oil wealth. Additionally, as the size of the government grew, oil wealth
gave elite family members significant leeway in creating bureaucracies according to their
interests and wishes. Moreover, while oil gave them the freedom to make political decisions
about the structure and operations of new state agencies and organizations, it did not
“predetermine” these choices but instead furthered choices that were made for other reasons.174
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All of this is not to suggest that oil did not have any effect on the development of Saudi
Arabia’s political structures. Clearly, oil revenues funded the expansion of the state bureaucracy
both in terms of the number of government institutions and public sector jobs. However, oil
wealth did not determine what these structures and various institutions would look like. Rather,
elite royal family members made these decisions. Over time, they created a type of government
what Hertog (2010) calls a “hierarchical, vertically divided hub-and-spoke system,” in which
there are three levels: the macro, meso, and micro levels.175 The king and senior family
members comprise the macro-level, i.e., the ‘hub’; the ‘spokes’ are the state agencies and
organizations that comprise the meso-level; and the smaller “individual organizational units and
bureaucrats” located within meso-level organizations that constitute the micro-level. Many links
between state and society exist at the micro-level, as “small-scale personalized networks”
between micro-level employees and members of society facilitate the dispersing state
resources.176
According to Hertog, even though these political structures are organized in a ‘top-down’
fashion (where the leadership at the macro-level decides what national policies to pursue), they
are quite fragmented; the state has both efficient and inefficient parts. For example,
fragmentation occurs when political elites increase the number of institutions to the government
during oil surpluses.177 These additional organizations increase the size of an already large state
bureaucracy, which by its nature is already inefficient. On the other hand, some “islands of
efficiency” exist within the government, primarily ministries such as the Saudi Arabian

175

11.
These personalized networks are administered by individuals called “brokers.” Their role is described in more
detail towards the end of the chapter.
177
5.
176

52

Monetary Agency (SAMA), and are led by technocrats that specialize in certain areas.178 The
main characteristic of all of these agencies is the fact that they answer only to the macro-level of
the government.
This description of Saudi political structures is important because although oil has had a
tremendous impact on Saudia Arabia, both Herb and Hertog make clear that al-Saud family
members shaped what Saudi political structures looked like more so than any other factor. As
Hertog states, “there is no automatic mechanism that produces corruption, rent-seeking, and a
weak bureaucracy.”179 The family retained its pre-oil political structures and placed its members
in leadership positions throughout the government after oil revenues funded the expansion of the
bureaucracy. Furthermore, the authors demonstrate that even though oil wealth has provided the
monarchy with a high level of autonomy, there are no distinct boundaries between it and Saudi
society. In other words, similar to what Jessop and Mitchell discussed in Chapter II, Saudi
Arabia’s state and society boundaries overlap. Saudi society does in fact have the capacity to
affect the state in significant ways, something for which the rentier state theory does not account.
The implementation of government policy similarly illustrates this point. When leaders
in the macro-level order a policy to be implemented, it typically gets bogged down and reshaped
in the meso and micro-levels of the government.180 On the meso-level, state agencies, because
there are so many of them, have the ability to “veto” certain parts of policies.181 The same
essentially occurs on the micro-level. Administrators at these levels often delay the
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implementation of or interpret policies in different ways. Thus the meso and micro-levels make
it difficult for the government to enact many of its policies.
Hertog discusses the government policy project of increasing the numbers of Saudis in
the private sector, called “Saudization”, as an example of this.182 Saudization highlights the
overlapping boundaries of the state and society and challenges the claim of the rentier state
theory that the former is autonomous from the latter. The oil boom in the 1970s attracted large
numbers of foreign private sector workers to Saudi Arabia and their numbers soon exceeded that
of Saudi workers. This trend continued in the 1980s, 1990s and persists today. The public sector
could not afford to expand indefinitely to accommodate for the steadily increasing number of
Saudi graduates looking for work. Additionally, the number of available private sector jobs was
(and still is) much lower than that of government jobs, and they typically offered lower wages as
well so there was little incentive for Saudis to earn business degrees. As a result of these factors,
among others, the economic and political climate of the kingdom was vulnerable to instability.183
Saudi rulers recognized that the only way to Saudiize the private sector, as well as increase its
size, was through various government regulations. Ultimately, the monarchy understood that
economic growth could only come from the private sector.
Regulations came in the form of several government decrees, the first of which, Decree
50, was issued in 1995. It mandated that all businesses increase the number of Saudi employees
by five percent every year.184 Subsequent decrees mandated similar requirements. Other
regulations included raising the fees for work and residency permits for foreign workers in order
to encourage businesses to hire Saudi nationals. However, the fragmented structures of the
government discussed above prevented the proper implementation and enforcement of
182
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Saudization. Several factors, including confusing and inconsistent rules, the sheer size of
government agencies, the interplay of the micro, meso and macro levels within them, and
informal networks between state employees and society that bypass regulations, have given
lower levels of government the ability to ‘veto’ certain parts of Saudization and other state
policies.
In addition to its political structures, the monarchy has employed a number of strategies
in order to reinforce its rule. The state’s reemphasis of its Islamic character in 1979 in response
to Islamic uprisings (described below) in the Muslim holy city of Mecca and the Eastern
Province was one such strategy.185 The unrest of the latter will be discussed here. The strategy
is directly related to the discussion earlier in this chapter about the monarchy’s aim to control the
environment in the Eastern Province—oil and water—in order to gain legitimacy domestically
and abroad and to increase its power. The upswell in Islamic radicalism and opposition forced
the Saudi state in the 1980s and beyond to reemphasize its Wahabi indentity in order to
counteract the Islamic ideology espoused by the radical Shiites in the Eastern Province as well as
the radical Sunnis in Mecca. Ultimately, the strategy was a political decision to help the
monarchy stave off Islamic dissent and justify its rule. In terms of this thesis, it serves as an
alternative example to the argument (of the rentier state theory) that oil that rent income, in the
form of oil revenues, is the primary reason for the persistence of authoritarian in Saudi Arabia.
The strategy also demonstrates, how different factors can shape government policy.186 In Saudi
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Arabia, the monarchy’s reemphasis of Islam was the result of poor policy-making rather than a
strategy prompted by oil wealth.
The origins of the unrest in the Eastern Province stemmed from the government’s refusal
to acknowledge the “socioreligious and hierarchical system” in the al-Hasa oasis from the 1950s
onward.187 As mentioned earlier, the oasis was home to a mixed population of Sunnis and
Shiites who lived either in the area’s cities or villages. In the cities, Sunnis mostly constituted
the upper class (earning a living as traders) and the majority of Shiites were craftsmen. In the
villages, Shiites comprised the lower classes (craftsmen, agricultural laborers and small farmers)
and Sunnis comprised the upper class (large landowners). The relationship between the Sunnis
and Shiites in cities and the villages was neutral at best. However, the relationship between the
Shiite population and the Sunni monarchy had always been acrimonious because of religious
differences. As adherers of Wahhabism, an anti-Shiite branch of Islam, the monarchy’s rulers
viewed the Shiites in al-Hasa with disdain and repeatedly ignored their presence.188
This trend continued during and after the completion of the IDP project in 1971. The
project, though promising at first, depleted water levels which in turn decreased the amount of
land available for cultivation and in the end, the project thus failed to significantly increase
agricultural output. Large landowners, most of whom were Sunni, were able to survive because
they owned the larger tracts of land. Smaller Shiite farmers could no longer continue working as
farmers and were forced to move to urban areas or work as agricultural laborers for the
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landowners. Thus far from benefitting the entire population of the oasis, the project reinforced
the hierarchical social structure described in Vidal’s report.189
The IDP project was part of the government’s overall modernization efforts. The
government declared in 1962 that it would pursue development aims of controlling and
maximizing the use of natural resources, creating self-sufficient agriculture, and investing in
industry and infrastructure. The Shiites living in the Eastern Province, however, saw very little
of this development and continued to experience not only discrimination but they also suffered
from poor living conditions (water pollution, disease, old water and sewage infrastructure). The
situation was the opposite in cities in the province, Damman, Dhahran and al-Khobar, which had
greatly benefited from government development. As a result, decades of uneven development
socially and politically marginalized small coastal towns and villages that used to be centers of
commerce and a vibrant cultural life.190 Alienated Shiite residents expressed their frustration in
local newspapers but the government rejected and suppressed their concerns.
Thus in effect, by ignoring the Shiite’s grievances for decades, the monarchy allowed
opposition to accumulate to a breaking point where some of them turned to Shi’a Islam “as a
framework within which to express political dissent.”191 This frustration manifested itself in the
November 1979 protests.192 The decades of social, political and economic marginalization,
proved to be too much to bear for the Shiites in the Eastern Province. The accumulation of all of
these factors resulted in a major political shift in the province in the late 1970s: the formation of
a radical Shi’a Islamist movement that was frustrated with their subservient living conditions and
189
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infused with ideological fervor against the government.193 It is important note here that the
January 1979 Iranian Revolution, in which Shi’a Islam served as its ideological base,
significantly influenced and energized the Shi’a Muslims in the Eastern Province, though it did
not directly lead to the uprising there.194 The Islamic Republic wanted to assert and increase its
influence in the region. For example, it actively supported the Shi’a uprising in the Eastern
Province in order to try to undermine Saudi Arabia from within.195
The monarchy recognized how vulnerable it was after the protest and that it needed to
reinforce its Islamic credentials in order to undermine the strength of the Islamic opposition.196
Specifically, it enhanced the power of religious authorities, increased the emphasis of Islam in
the education, suppressed anti-Islamic behavior, and bolstered the image of Saudi Arabia as an
Islamic state to the rest of the world.197 The monarchy also increased the authority of the
religious police, who enforced strict adherence to Wahhabi codes of social behavior, and built
new religious schools (madrasas) and universities that promoted the study of Islam.198 The result
was a government in the 1980s that based its legitimacy not on modernization, development,
science and expertise, but rather, to one that based its authority on Islam; it essentially renewed
Saudi Arabia’s national identity back to Islam.199
In addition to emphasizing its Islamic identity and promoting Islam in the kingdom, in
the 1980s and beyond, the Saudi government also strengthened its ties with the United States.
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By protecting the monarchy, the United States has, in effect, actively supported authoritarianism
in Saudi Arabia. The theory does not acknowledge this fact or the significantly consequential
role it plays. As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the economic, political and military
relationships between the United States and Saudi Arabia were already well established and
continued to serve the interests of both countries. By 1980, the United States was the biggest
investor in the Saudi oil industry and sold the most arms to the kingdom. Saudi Arabia, in turn,
eventually “became the largest investor in American banks, treasury bonds and real estate.”200
These linkages, however, reveal a crucial fact about the Saudi Arabia: it has an
authoritarian system of government but a weak and fragmented military despite the enormous
sums of money invested in it. The vast amounts of oil wealth at monarchy’s disposal would
predict an authoritarian regime as well as a strong military to support the government, but this is
not the case in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia developed strong military ties with the United States
to ensure the external security that a military would typically provide. In other words, American
military protection has effectively taken the place of a strong Saudi military.
According to Ayubi (1995), this situation is due to Saudi Arabia’s internal security
conditions. The fear of a military takeover of the government, which almost occurred on several
occasions between the 1950s and 1970s, prevents the monarchy from creating a robust armed
forces. To ameliorate threats originating from the military, the monarchy has resorted to various
measures, including providing senior officers with financial and material rewards, balancing
different military branches off each other, assigning top military posts to officer-princes,
increasing wages, and improving living and training conditions.201 Ultimately, the monarchy has
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essentially created a decentralized military, one that is unlikely to attempt a coup. The United
States, too, did not fully advocate for the development of a strong Saudi military because, as
Ayubi states, it feared a military coup just as much as they did any external threat to the
kingdom. Maintaining regional stability was and continues to be America’s upmost concern and
protecting Saudi Arabia, even if that meant supporting an authoritarian government, was a key
component of those efforts.
This was important throughout much of Saudi Arabia’s history but the monarchy
strengthened its relationship with the United States even more during and after the 1980s. Both
countries shared mutual interests during several geopolitical events over this period: the fall of
the Shah in Iran in 1979202, the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan in October of 1979203, the IranIraq War (1980-1988)204, the first Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991)205, the rise of radical
Islamic terrorism in the 1990s206, and Iran’s current rise as a major regional player in the
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aftermath at the end of the Second Gulf War (2003-2011)207. Discussing each of these in detail
would be far too long for this thesis, however each illustrates the extent to which both Saudi
Arabia and the United States have shared strategic interests.
Thus far, it has been a mutually beneficial partnership, something that does not conform
to the rentier state theory, which argues that Saudi Arabian’s oil wealth keeps the monarchy in
power. The legacy of American interests and involvement in Saudi Arabia described by Robert
Vitalis remains to this day. Saudi Arabia still depends on the United States for protection and
continues to purchase American weaponry. The economic ties have remained strong as well.
Saudi Arabia sends a large portion of its exports to the United States, American companies invest
the most in Saudi Arabia, and the United States relies on the Saudis to keep other OPEC
members from increasing oil prices.208 These and other ties have clearly benefited both
countries, but perhaps more so for Saudi Arabia in terms of its survival. Without American
support, in its various forms, the Saudi monarchy may not have survived this long.
Saudi Arabia’s social policies have been crucial for its survival as well. This is
predicated by the rentier state theory, which argues that social spending of rent income tends to
create largely acquiescent societies. Indeed, government expenditures on society have
undoubtedly been a central feature of Saudi Arabia’s history post-WWII and an important
government strategy to remain in power. Saudi Arabia’s enormous oil revenues (oil revenues
increased from approximately $110 billion dollars in 1951 to 47.5 billion dollars in 1992; after
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1973 revenues increased exponentially then leveled off when the boom ended in the 1980s209)
enabled it to fund social service and infrastructure projects, such as the IDP project, throughout
society in order to ensure that Saudi citizens, at least the majority of the population and
especially elites with connections to the state, could benefit from the wealth generated by the oil
industry.
The Saudi government did not provide social services to the population and invest in
infrastructure projects simply for altruistic purposes. In other words, it is not enough for an
authoritarian government’s survival to only distribute oil revenues to society. In Saudi Arabia’s
case, in addition to its political structures and ties with the United States, the monarchy has
employed a specific strategy what Hertog calls “cooptation.”210 Hertog defines cooptation as the
process by which the Saudi government, as its bureaucracy increased in size, coopted virtually
every part of society. Before and after the 1950s, the monarchy allocated oil revenues towards
itself, the military, the police, and towards tribes and religious organizations in the form of state
subsidies.211 As the Saudi government grew in size thanks to the ever-increasing oil revenues, it
expanded its reach into and “reshape[d] significant parts of society.”212 In other words, the
government progressively penetrated and brought society under its jurisdiction as it established
new ministries and other state institutions. Solidifying state power was the ultimate objective of
cooptation.
Cooptation directly reflects of the political structures of the government itself, described
earlier as a hierarchical, “hub and spoke” system of highly fragmented parts. The continuous
flow of oil revenues, particularly during the oil boom years, and the royal family’s complete
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control of the expansion of the government, increased the size of the state in a rather disorderly
manner. Government officials and those individuals with connections to the state called
“brokers” created numerous networks within the state that bridged the gap between the rigid,
hierarchical state political structures and society.213 Brokers serve as intermediaries between the
state and society (specifically, individuals or groups of individuals) and their service is
effectively the only means through which Saudis can gain access to state resources.
Additionally, brokers have very specific functions and ties to certain areas in the state. Thus
individuals attain access to state resources primarily from the local, micro-level, not through the
larger government institutions.214
Through the mechanism of bureaucratic cooptation, the Saudi state brought society
increasingly under its guidance and control in several ways. Employment in the public sector
was one such approach. The number of government employees rose as the size of the
government grew. Between 1970 and 1980, the government established ten new ministries in
addition to twenty new government agencies.215 Accordingly, the government hired over
300,000 public sector employees, increasing the number from 120,000 in 1970. Expanding
social services was another method the government used. During the 1970s and beyond,
government social expenditures reached virtually every part of Saudi society except in the
Eastern Province. The government increased investments in health care, education and
housing.216 By the 1990s, the government built over 250 new hospitals, hundreds of health
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clinics around the country, and raised the number of doctors and medical personnel to over
seventy thousand people.217 Expanding education was particularly important. The government
wanted graduates with technical degrees in order to proceed with its modernization efforts. The
education system in Saudi Arabia was rather small compared to other Arab countries in the
1950s but by the early 1970s, the government spent one billion dollars to expand it. The
government hired thousands of foreign teachers and founded several teacher-training colleges.
Religious colleges, universities and institutes were opened, including the secular Riyadh
University. Hundreds of thousands of boys and girls were enrolled in schools (the number of
boys outnumbered that of girls and they were taught separately) and thousands of undergraduate
and graduate students were enrolled in colleges and universities. After graduation, they found
employment almost entirely in the public sector.218 By the 1990s, seven universities had been
established as well as a number of engineering colleges. Finally, in terms of housing, the
government built approximately 2.5 million housing units by the 1990s. (Vassiliev, 433-434)
The Saudi government was mostly or almost entirely autonomous from society thereby
during the 1950s and 1960s,, an outcome predicted by the rentier state theory, as the royal family
took it upon itself to make political and social decisions without outside input, even from the key
social groups of merchants, tribes or Muslim religious leaders (ulama).219 However, this chapter
has described the growth of the Saudi state over time and its relations with society, the process of
which increased the connections and linkages between them. The state incurred increasing levels
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of obligations towards society and was unwilling to retract these commitments.220 Therefore, not
only did the state-society boundaries overlap, as argued by Jessop and Mitchell in Chapter II,
society came to hold the state accountable through the state’s obligations to its people. This
accountability demonstrates that Saudi Arabia’s state and society are indeed not distinct entities;
numerous connections exist between them. Furthermore, the variety and large number of
government institutions, social networks and hierarchies kept “society fragmented and dependent
upon the state.”221 In effect, every part of society, from elites to Saudi citizens, became “clients”
of the state through public sector employment, social services and specific government agencies
(via brokers). As a result of this heterogeneity of the government, there was little possibility for
the aggregation of interests among different parts of society.222 Thus collective opposition and
the demand for fundamental political change to the government has yet never materialized in
Saudi Arabia.223 Therefore, Saudi authoritarianism relies upon a complex web of cultural, social
and political factors rather than dependence on oil revenues.
The strategies and mechanisms outlined in this chapter also account for the lack of
political change and the monarchy’s long-term survival. Emphasizing its Islamic identity was
the monarchy’s response to counteract the Shiite uprising and its powerful and arguably justified
anger at the government. Decades of cooptation by widening the government’s reach into
society helped consolidate the royal family’s rule. Oil income funded this expansion as well as
other modernization projects, including the IDP project. As essential as oil has been for Saudi
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Arabia, however, it did not predetermine the choices the government made in expanding the state
or decisions it made to stay in power.
C. Enduring Authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring
Notwithstanding the protests throughout the Middle East in early 2011, the Arab Spring
did not alter Saudi Arabia’s political structures. The monarchy undoubtedly used its oil revenues
to keep discontent at a minimum, but there is more to the picture than this. To be clear, the
monarchy remains firmly in control and there is no sign that it is in any danger of collapsing.
Like the Iranian case, this resilience would appear to validate the rentier state theory, given the
fact that Saudi Arabia possesses the world’s largest oil reserves in the world and is thus
considered the quintessential rentier state. As shown in this chapter, oil wealth has indeed
provided Saudi Arabia with the financial resources to modernize and provide numerous kinds of
benefits for its people. The monarchy used this tactic on February 23rd, 2011, when King
Abdullah announced a $37 billion aid package that would be distributed among Saudi citizens in
the form of pay raises, unemployment benefits, affordable family housing and others.224 This
action taken by the government is a clear case of rentierism at work. Yet the evidence presented
in the preceding pages points to other, more consequential factors that have enabled the
monarchy to prevent any internal dissent during the Arab Spring, not least of which, the
American-Saudi partnership.
The ongoing Arab Spring protests in Saudi Arabia’s small Persian Gulf neighbor,
Bahrain, demonstrate this clearly. They are important not only because they aim to bring about
democratic reform to the kingdom, they highlight the significant role the American-Saudi
relationship plays in Middle East politics in blocking the emergence of democracy in the region
224
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as a whole for the sake of regional stability. This relationship is perhaps the most decisive factor
that challenges the notion that Saudi Arabia has withstood, internally, the powerful wave of Arab
Spring protests because of its oil wealth.
Though not directly affected by the Arab Spring within its borders, Saudi Arabia has
several reasons to be wary of it, especially in Bahrain. As an authoritarian country, Saudi Arabia
is fearful of any external democratic impulses in the Middle East because such influences would
have the potential to foment domestic dissent. Saudi Arabia had already experienced this kind of
turmoil in the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution when the Shiites in the Eastern Province rose
up against the government. As a result, the monarchy has been mindful of the Arab Spring
because its calls for democratic reforms and political pluralism directly challenge the monarchy’s
power as well as the regional stability of the Persian Gulf in general.
Such a challenge arose when Arab Spring protests began in February 2011 in Bahrain.
Bahrain consists of a majority Shi’a population that is ruled by the Sunni, al-Khalifa monarchy.
The monarchy rules with a firm, often repressive grip over the Shi’a population.225 They are
essentially an alienated population and receive few of the benefits of Bahrain’s oil wealth.
Emulating the other protests in the Middle East, the Shi’a called for a parliament that was
actually representative of the entire population and, because unemployment is high among them,
demanded more job opportunities in the government and lucrative economic sector.226 The
situation escalated on March 14th when Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates agreed to
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deploy security 1,500 forces to help suppress the protests.227 The security forces immediately
began a violent and bloody crackdown (protests are still occurring at the time of this writing).
The stability of Bahrain is very important for both the United States and Saudi Arabia.
For the United States, Bahrain is a vital component of the United States’ geostrategic policy in
the Middle East. It is the location of the United States Naval Forces Central Command and
home to the U.S. Fifth Naval Fleet. The United States worries that any kind of instability would
disrupt the flow of oil coming from the Persian Gulf and threaten its allies there, particularly
Saudi Arabia. There is also a perception in the United States and in Saudi Arabia that Iran is
supporting the Shi’a protesters in Bahrain.228 If true, this would pose a significant problem
because Iran and Saudi Arabia have been regional political and ideological rivals (Iran is a Shi’a
majority country and Saudi Arabia is a Sunni majority country) since the Iranian Revolution in
1979. The United States and Iran have been at odds for most of the time ever since. The Arab
Spring protests in Bahrain added new urgency to protecting Saudi Arabia from Iran and any
other threats.229
Saudi Arabia’s concerns with Bahrain are essentially the same as that of the United
States. Ensuring the subservience of the Shi’a population in Bahrain Saudi Arabia has been an
essential part of Saudi Arabia’s strategy to protect itself from any internal dissent that threatens
its security. The Saudi monarchy has a significant amount of leverage over the al-Khalifa
monarchy principally because Bahrain does not have as much oil as other gulf states so it relies

227

Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are connected by the King Fahd Causeway. Also, it should be noted that many Sunnis
joined the protests as well.
228
Thomas Fuller. “Bahrainis Fear the U.S. Isn’t Behind Their Fight for Democracy,” The New York Times (March
4, 2011): http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/world/middleeast/05bahrain.html?_r=1 [accessed 1-13-12].
229
This sentiment was underscored on December 29, 2011 the United States agreed to sell Saudi Arabia $30 billion
dollars in F-15 jet fighter airplanes. BBC News (December 29, 2011): http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada16358068 [accessed 1-13-12].

68

on Saudi Arabia to provide it with hundreds of millions of dollars each year.230 According to
Herb, this is a key reason why Bahrain did not open a new parliament for so long. As essentially
its benefactor, Saudi Arabia has not wanted Bahrain to do so for fear of giving the Shi’a
population a space to express their demands upon the government. This, inevitably, would
decrease some of the monarchy’s power and would perhaps threaten its very authority.
Additionally, like the United States, the Saudi government fears that increased Shi’a
representation in the government would invite the influence and interference of Iran in Bahraini
affairs, which has in fact occurred in the past.231 Thus, for all of the reasons described above,
when Arab Spring protests began in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia knew that it needed to act. The
United States agreed with this as well. Although it has condemned the level of violence and
brutality of the crackdown, it has not pressured the government to change policies. By doing
this, the United States essentially acknowledged the double standard it has applied to other Arab
Spring protests.232 For example it, along with other NATO member states, provided military
support of the overthrow of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi but effectively gave the green
light to the Saudis to send the security forces into Bahrain.
The above examination of the Arab Spring protests in Bahrain, and their implications for
the region, demonstrate that the persistence of authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia during the Arab
Spring is a result of one of the important pieces of evidence put forward in this chapter—the
longstanding American-Saudi relationship. While the United States cannot outright dictate to
Saudi Arabia about what its internal and external policies ought to be, for over half of a century,
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with intermittent and sometimes serious disagreements such as during the 1973 Oil Crisis, their
partnership has been mutually beneficial. The United States government, along with other
Western governments, want to ensure that the global oil market remains secure and stable. The
Saudi monarchy, in turn, wants the continued American protection and to remain in power.
Therefore, while oil is certainly a crucial underlying factor in this discussion, the failure of the
Arab Spring to cause fundamental political change in Saudi Arabia has more to do with the
kingdom’s ties with the United States than its oil wealth. Oil revenue has certainly enabled the
monarchy to stave off opposition and is an important reason why the monarchy has survived, but
it is only one component of the story of enduring authoritarianism in Saudi Arabia.
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Chapter V: Conclusion
This thesis has presented a more nuanced examination of the persistence of
authoritarianism in the Middle East than the rentier state theory can account for. In each case
study, both internal and external contexts were examined and it was found that certain factors
have played a significant consequential role in determining what the current political (as well as
social and economic) situation is in each country. The Iranian and Saudi regimes have used
different mechanisms and strategies to maintain their position in power. Oil revenues were and
continue to be a major source of income that supports the regimes, but oil in itself does not
predetermine the decisions made by political leaders. Oil, for example, is not the dominant force
within the political structures of the Islamic Republic nor does it have any bearing on the extent
to which Islam is embedded within Iranian society. Likewise in Saudi Arabia, while oil revenues
funded the expansion of the monarchy, they do not account for the pre-monarchy tribal structures
that remained in place after the kingdom’s founding or predetermine what newly established
state institutions would look like. Nor do oil revenues account for the strategies the monarchy
has employed to ensure its survival. Lastly, the Cold War context played a significant and
consequential role in shaping internal events in both countries.
At its core, the rentier state theory makes an important assumption about the relationship
between state and society. The theory assumes that it can explain whether a government will be
either democratic or authoritarian and, accordingly, how each type of government will behave,
based on this relationship. In non-rentier states, the government bargains with its citizens about
the amount of taxes it imposes on them in exchange for representation in the government. In this
way, citizens are able to hold their government accountable. The end result of this process is a
democratic government (though, to be sure, not all non-rentier states are democratic). On the
other hand, in rentier states, given the fact that these governments control the resources
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independently of society, governments do not need to make such an accommodations with their
citizens because rent preclude the need for taxes and thus the need for negotiation. Moreover,
the regime distributes some of this income to key constituencies. For both of these reasons, this
frees the government from sharing political power with society and it becomes powerful and
authoritarian as a result. In other words, the rentier aspect of the economy provides the
government with increased political power. Rentier states ensure support by distributing rent
income throughout society, usually in the form of social services. Furthermore, the rentier state
theory is premised on the notion of exceptionalism—the notion that Middle Eastern culture is
incompatible with democracy. However, rather than focusing on culture, the theory argues that
the region’s economics make it exceptional. Thus proponents of the rentier state theory view the
region as an economic anomaly, an ‘other’, similar to those who still view Middle Eastern
culture in the same manner.
In contrast, this thesis has provided a more sound theoretical framework through which to
investigate authoritarianism in the Middle East. The framework looks at the cases of Iran and
Saudi Arabia in a wholistic manner. For example, in terms of the belief in Middle Eastern
exceptionalism, in both cultural and economic terms, this approach reveals why exceptionalism
is a flawed concept. The acceptance of this notion overrides the possibility that authoritarianism
stems from other factors: the history, external contexts or, in particular, internal social, economic
and political conditions—like those explored in the preceding chapters—of authoritarian
countries in the Middle East.
Furthermore, as the cases illustrate, a wholistic understanding of the state-society
relationship will take into account the fact that state and society are not two separate entities but
rather overlap each other. The Iranian and Saudi Arabian cases uphold the view that the state
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can rarely act independently of its people, with or without a representative body. In Iran, the
state formation process that took place during and after the Iranian Revolution emerged out of
the complex socio-economic and repressive context of the Pahlavi regime. The Shah’s
modernization policies, while providing many benefits, also led to unintended consequences,
failed to reach the expectations of the public and alienated many Iranians, perhaps the most
important of whom were the clergy. This societal context before the revolution thus had a
tremendous impact on the structure of the Islamic Republic. Though the new government
retained much of the previous state, it repudiated the Pahlavi monarchical rule. Furthermore, in
terms of Saudi Arabia, the state may appear to be autonomous from its society but, as described
in Chapter IV, Saudi society influences the outcome and implementation of state policies.
Additionally, the responsibility of the Saudi state to provide Saudis with social services,
infrastructure projects and other benefits, is another example that state-society boundaries
overlap.
Iran and Saudi Arabia’s historical record also challenges many of the assumptions of the
rentier state theory. One is that oil alone is the primary factor that has maintained the
governments in both countries to remain in power but the historical record counters this
assumption. Up until the Iranian Revolution in 1979, the United States and Britain had a stake in
ensuring that Iran remained a stable, reliable ally during the Cold War. The fact that they
restored the Shah’s rule in the 1953 coup and continued to support his regime exemplifies this.233
Another assumption is that rentier regimes and their leaders should not fall from power but the
Shah was, in fact, overthrown. In terms of Saudi Arabia, foreign involvement was a similarly an
important feature of its history. From Saudi Arabia’s establishment, to its decision to gain
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control the environment (which required significant levels of foreign expertise) in order to
consolidate of power, and to its continual strengthening of ties with the United States in the
decades following World War II, Saudi Arabia, like Iran, cannot be studied in isolation. The
development of the oil industry, in which the United States played such a crucial role,
particularly epitomizes this assertion. Certain historical events and circumstances contributed to
authoritarian regime durability in both countries.
The alternative paradigm offered in this thesis also accounts for the various mechanisms,
strategies and political structures that have enabled the Iranian and Saudi regimes to remain in
power. In Iran, the clerical establishment of the Islamic Republic solidified its rule soon after the
revolution with the concept of velayat-e faqeh enshrined in the constitution. The war with Iraq
provided the new government with an opportunity to bolster this Islamic identity and authority
by linking Islam with the surge of Iranian nationalism. Despite the enormous devastation caused
during the war Iraq, the constitutionally granted authority sustained the regime through the
duration of the war and subsequent attempts at fundamental democratic reforms in the latter part
1990s and early 2000s. To be sure, like the Pahlavi monarchy before it, the Islamic Republic has
relied on repressive measures to enforce its power—and oil revenue has been central to this—
most recently during the post-election protests in 2009. However effective repression may be, by
itself it is insufficient in maintaining a regime’s position in power. In Iran, the codified authority
of the clergy, and both the religion and the revolutionary ideology of the regime, have been the
regime’s primary sources of power rather than just its oil wealth.
In Saudi Arabia, the regime’s massive oil wealth facilitated its expansion and buttressed
its power but other factors have played a significant role in enabling the monarchy to survive.
As a dynastic monarchy, the royal family holds a firm grip on the entire government. Its family
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members are dispersed throughout the state bureaucracy ensuring that the monarchy safeguards
its authority in the large number of different state institutions. The family also controls the
succession of rule, which not only decides who leads Saudi Arabia, but also prevents internal
fracturing and the infiltration of those outside the family who have an interest in challenging the
monarchy’s power. In addition, the monarchy reemphasized its Islamic character as its main
source of legitimacy in response the Islamic uprisings in Mecca and the Eastern Province in
1979. The monarchy has long relied upon its Wahabist Islamic identity to bolster its support
among religious conservatives and the general population. Morevover, the monarchy maintained
and strengthened its relationship with the United States at various times. American support was
and remains a crucial reason why authoritarianism endures in Saudi Arabia.
In light of this entire discussion about the persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle
East, it is necessary now to revisit the discussions about the Arab Spring. This is necessary
because, at its core, this thesis is really about the prospects for democracy in the region. It has
shown why focusing on oil wealth is an insufficient and incomplete explanation for
authoritarianism in the region, but where does the discussion about enduring authoritarianism in
the Middle East go from this point forward? Additionally, what do the Iranian and Saudi
Arabian cases say about democracy? What are the broader implications of this thesis about the
prospects for democracy in the region?
As the previous two chapters indicate, the Arab Spring illustrates the importance of
examining the internal as well as external contexts of authoritarian Middle Eastern regimes. It is
only through this approach that one can understand the deeper issues that account for the
persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East. It is too simple to assert that authoritarianism
persists in Iran and Saudi Arabia because of oil. Likewise, it is too simple to argue that the Arab
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Spring did not reach both countries because of their oil wealth. In Iran, the government’s
political structures and its position at the helm of Shi’a Islam enabled it to survive presidential
elections and prevent the Arab Spring from making any significant inroads in Iran. In terms of
Saudi Arabia, the Saudi-American partnership essentially blocked the Arab Spring protests in
Bahrain from spreading into Saudi Arabia.
This study demonstrates that not only do many factors contribute to the persistence of
authoritarianism, it also points to a larger observation about democracy and the emergence of
democracy in general. The complexity and the uncertainty of what the process of
democratization entails confirms the inaccuracy of dismissing the lack of democracy in the
Middle East as an anomaly from the rest of the world. Successful democratic development,
wherever it occurs and has occurred, such as in the United States and Europe, is a complicated,
multi-dimensional and long-term process. Although scholars and political scientists all agree
that a political environment where the ruling government allows the people’s voices to be heard
is an essential component of democratization, they continue to debate about exactly which
factors such a process requires.234 However, simply because it is a difficult and often unclear
process does not mean that democracy cannot emerge in the Middle East. Thus it is erroneous to
contend that the democratic deficit in the Middle East is an abnormality.
Although it remains to be seen whether fundamental democratic outcomes will come to
fruition in the future, the Arab Spring movement is testament to this assertion. The Arab Spring
is indicative of the real, though very difficult, possibility that democracy can in fact emerge in
the Middle East. Democratization requires an environment in which the people are able to
express their demands upon whoever is in charge. The movement has provided people across the
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region with an opportunity to do so. As mentioned previously, the people of Egypt, Tunisia and
Libya have forced their respective leaders to step down. Now, all three countries have begun
taking steps towards some form of democratic governance. Moreover, if past examples are any
indication, democracies throughout the world came into fruition after long periods of turmoil and
uncertainty. The United States experienced eight years of war before finally gaining its
independence from Great Britain. With all of these facts in mind, the current struggles for
democratic reform in the Middle East are no different, in terms of length of time and difficulty,
than those of established democracies. Therefore, democracy is no less likely to emerge in the
region than anywhere else in the world.
The Arab Spring also demonstrates, again, the importance of examining the specific
contexts and conditions of authoritarian Middle Eastern countries. Only through this approach
will one understand what factors have contributed to unfavorable internal and external conditions
that block fundamental democratic reform. This thesis has followed the same approach. In order
to comprehend why authoritarianism endures in Iran and Saudi Arabia, as well as in other
countries in the Middle East, it is necessary to investigate each country closely, taking into
account the historical, political, economic and cultural factors that all shape a country’s makeup.
Once having done this, one will see that the absence, thus far, of democracies in the region is not
reducible to a one-fits-all explanation, but rather due to interdependent and complicated sets of
factors.
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